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COMMENT
APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY: "WHO DECIDES WHAT
CONSTITUTES A CRIME?" AN ANALYSIS
OF WHETHER A LEGISLATURE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY FREE TO "ALLOCATE" AN
ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE TO AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OR A SENTENCING FACTOR
WITHOUT JUDICIAL REVIEW
B. Patrick Costello, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Apprendi v.
New Jersey1 addressed "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 requires that a factual determination authorizing
an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10
to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."3 In "what will surely be remembered as a watershed
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2002; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1990; M.B.A., Old Dominion University, 1999. I would like to thank my
parents, B. Patrick and Mary Lucretia Costello, my brother, John, and my sisters,
Elizabeth and Maureen, for their constant love and encouragement. I would also like
to thank G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, for his
invaluable advice and support throughout the preparation of this Comment.
1 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes a state from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Apprend4 530 U.S. at 469 (citation added). Delivering the opinion of the
Court in another case, Justice O'Connor wrote that "beyond a reasonable doubt"
means "[p]roof to a 'moral certainty'...." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12 (1994)
(citations omitted). "A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt ... as
distinguishedfrom a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or
1205
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change in constitutional law,"4 the Apprendi Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment commands that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion correctly noted that "[t]his case turns on the seemingly simple
question of what constitutes a 'crime."' 6 Indeed, all .of the constitutional protections 7 that citizens accused of a crime in this country enjoy turn on determining which facts constitute the "crime"-in other
words, which facts are the "elements" of the crime. 8 This Comment
explores the issue of whether it is constitutional for a legislative body
to allocate an element of an offense to an affirmative defense or a
sentencing factor without that decision being subject to judicial review.9 Part I provides the analytical tools necessary to examine this
issue, including a thorough discussion on the elements and factors
traditionally thought to constitute a "crime," a general overview of
sentencing, a brief survey of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, an
outline of how a defendant convicted of a crime may be sentenced
under the Federal Guidelines, and several prominent Supreme Court
decisions that have helped mold the current constitutional framework
from fanciful conjecture." Id. at 20 (citation omitted). A dictionary definition for
beyond a reasonable doubt is "It] he degree of proof required of the state in a criminal prosecution; a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense, growing out of
the evidence in the case; not an imaginary, captious, or possible doubt." BALLENTINE'S LAW DIcTIoNAtY 133 (3d ed. 1969) (citation omitted). On the other hand,
"preponderance of evidence" means "the greater weight of the credible evidence ....
It] he probability of the truth; evidence more convincing as worthy of belief than that
which is.offered in opposition thereto." Id. at 980.
4 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5 See id. at 476.
6 Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
7 Justice Thomas summarizes that an accused person has
the right (1) "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"
(that is, the basis on which he is accused of a crime), (2) to be "held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime" only on an indictment or
presentment of a grand jury, and (3) to be tried by "an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VI; citing U.S. CONsT.
art. III, § 2, cl. 3).
8 Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 Apprendi is a dynamic case of great import, and consequently new cases involving the Court's decision are decided nationwide practically every day. Therefore, for
purposes of efficiency and the demands inherent in the publication process, this
Comment generally addresses federal cases that have been decided on or before October 15, 2001.
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for the federal criminal law and that influenced the Apprendi Court.
Part II presents in detail the Supreme Court's Apprendi decision and
its background, including pertinent cases that the Supreme Court examined in arriving at this decision. Part III surveys various policy considerations that the United States Supreme Court considered in
reaching its Apprendi decision and provides an overview of certain considerations that the Court overlooked or underestimated. Finally, this
Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should reconsider its
holding in the Apprendi case and recommends that the Court hold
that a judge may constitutionally increase a convicted defendant's
punishment based on a mere preponderance of the evidence.
I.

THE NECESSARY ANALy'IncAL TOOLS: AN OVERVIEW OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES A "CRIME," A SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, How PuNISHMEfNT Is DETERMINED, AND BACKGROUND
CASES NECESSARY To UNDERSTAND APPRENDI

A.

What Constitutes a "Crime"?

Before describing the policy and background of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is appropriate to examine "what constitutes a
crime." To answer correctly, it is necessary to understand the basic
definitions required for meaningful statutory interpretation. These
statutory "building blocks" should then be analyzed under a thorough
and logical method of elemental analysis. Indeed, "[s] tatutes should
be construed under well-settled rules of interpretation in order to
avoid constitutional issues."' 0 Only in this manner, with the necessary
analytical tools and framework firmly in place, may an accurate and
efficient attempt be made to find an answer to the question of what
constitutes a crime. 1

10 G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its
Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability
Under[RICO), 33 AM. CraM. L. Riv. 1345, 1571 (1996) (discussing statutory interpretation of § 1963 of the RICO statute).
11 At the risk of grossly oversimplifying the vast and complicated field of criminal
jurisprudence, not to mention the risk of offending a reader fluent in the terms of art
in this field, this Commeit next undertakes to provide a set of fundamental, working
definitions and analytical tools that will provide the reader a basic framework with
which to approach the Apprendi issue. Regrettably, time and space considerations do
not allow a more expansive treatment of the definitions and analytical tools that is to
follow.
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1. Definitions
To begin, a "crime" may be defined as "an act committed, or
omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it."12 Therefore, logic dictates that the next step in this process is
to determine precisely what is an "offense." Typically, an "offense" is
comprised of selected facts, called "elements," that define the crime.
Examples of elements include conduct (i.e., an act or omission), attendant surrounding circumstances, and results. 13 Culpability elements ("state of mind") are applied to each element (except for strict
liability crimes); they include purpose ("intent"), knowledge, reckless14
ness, or negligence.
Nevertheless, "[w] here an actor satisfies all of the elements of an
offense.., he nonetheless may be acquitted of the offense if he satisfies the conditions of a defense." 15 Some "defenses" are nothing more
than the absence of a required offense element. 16 Other defenses are
12 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. The Supreme Court has long recognized that, unlike the states, the federal government has no common-law jurisdicdon in the area of criminal justice: "The legislative authority of the Union must first
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offence." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32, 34 (1812). Furthermore, federal criminal jurisdiction only applies if Congress
confers such a jurisdiction on the federal courts. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 105 (1820).
13 The Model Penal Code defines the term "element" in a similar fashion:
"'[E]lement of an offense' means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii) such a result of conduct as (a) is included in the description of the
forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or (b) establishes the required
kind of culpability...." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) general definitions (Official
Draft & Explanatory Notes 1962).
14 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 54 (2d ed. 1995). An
example of the objective elements of murder might be the requirement
that an actor engage in conduct that causes the death of another human being.
The culpability elements might require that the actor know the nature of his
conduct, that it will cause a death, and that the death caused is that of a
human being (e.g., not that of an inviable fetus). The culpability requirements may be different for different elements of the same offense. Ajurisdiction might, for example, require that an actor know the nature of his
conduct and that it will cause a death, but only require that the actor be
reckless as to whether the death is that of a human being.
Id. at 54-55; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 49 n.13
(2d ed. 1986).
15 ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 56 (emphasis added).
16 See id. For example, if one takes a black umbrella, not his own, under the
mistaken impression that it is his black umbrella, he may claim a "mistake of fact
defense." As the definition of theft requires that the actor know that the property
taken is the property of another, the required state of mind of "knowledge" of the
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independent of the offense elements. They typically refine or qualify
the definition of an alleged offense. 17 A further subset of defenses,
known as "general defenses," may be unrelated to a particular offense
and instead apply to all offenses.' 8 Examples of these are justifications
21
("affirnmative defenses"),19 excuses, 20 and nonexculpatory defenses.
Justifications and excuses may be aptly distinguished by the following
facts is not satisfied. Such a mistake defense is called a "failure of proof defense,"
since it derives from the inability of the state to prove a required element, i.e., knowledge that it is not his umbrella. See id.
17 See id. at 57. For example, some types of assault are frequently defined as "unconsented to touching." Yet if the "victim" actually granted consent, then that consent
may be recognized as a defense to the assault for the accused. This would be known
as an "offense modification defense." See id.
18 See id.
19 See id. An actor may satisfy all of the elements of an offense, and his conduct
may be a legally recognized harm or evil of the sort that generally is prohibited; the
circumstances of the offense may suggest, however, that because of the justifying circumstances, this particular offense conduct ought to be tolerated or even encouraged. See id. Justifications ("affirmative defenses") include (1) self-defense, (2)
defense of property, (3) defense of others, and (4) law enforcement; they may entail
placing the burden of proof on the defendant. An affirmative defense does not negate an element of the crime; rather, it means that the accused committed the act, but
had an excuse. Examples of such justification defenses include assaulting another in
self-defense and purposely burning another's farm (i.e., committing arson) in order
to create a firebreak to save a town from a raging forest fire. See id. Affirmative defenses may be determined by a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, using "insanity" as an example, the government has to prove that the accused is sane beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the affirmative defense of insanity, which the
defendant could prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)
(insanity); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952) (allowing Oregon
to require a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
Affirmative defenses play a definite and important role in advanced criminologies. In a concurring opinion to People v. Patterson,347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (N.Y. 1976),
the precursor appellate case to Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (discussed
infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text), ChiefJudge Breitel presents an effective
argument against a state forestalling or discouraging the use of affirmative defenses.
He begins with a premonition of what might occur if affirmative defenses were
abolished.
In the absence of affirmative defenses the impulse to legislators, especially in
periods of concern about the rise of crime, would be to define particular
crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave only to sentence the adjustment between offenses of lesser and greater degree. In times when there is
also a retrogressive impulse in legislation to restrain courts by mandatory
sentences, the evil would be compounded.
Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 909. Affirmative defenses, when intelligently used, permit the
gradation of offenses at earlier stages in the prosecution and trial, thus offering a
defendant the opportunity to allege or prove, if possible, any distinction between the
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statement: "A justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful
22

act."

2.

23
Analytical "Tools"

Having thus established basic definitions, it is next appropriate to
briefly survey the actual "elements" of an offense. In conducting an
offense charged and mitigating circumstances which could ameliorate the degree or
kind of offense. See id.
A homicide case provides an appropriate example. Without an affirmative defense, the crime of murder or manslaughter could legislatively be defined as simply
"intent to kill," unaffected by the spontaneity with which that intent is formed or any
mitigating circumstances that might legally lower the grade of crime. See id. Indeed,
placing the burden of proof on the defense, even with a lower threshold, is fair because of the defendant's knowledge or access to evidence other than his own on the
issue. See id. On the other hand, to require the prosecution to prove the negation of
such mitigating circumstances is unfair, for it requires the prosecution to admit to the
jury the possible existence of those factors and then, in the face of definitional and
circular reason, prove their non-existence. See id. One sign of a more mature and
developed criminology is the free use of sophisticated distinctions-guarding, of
course, against abuse. See id. at 910. The goals should be "more appropriate definition of and sanctions for crime, and a retreat from primitive notions about crime
based on a result alone or based largely on result." Id. In sum, the appropriate use of
affirmative defenses marks "a shift from primitive mechanical classifications based on
the bare antisocial act and its consequences, rather than on the nature of the offender and the conditions which produce some degree of excuse for his conduct,
[and this is] the mark of an advanced criminology." Id.
20 ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 57. An actor's conduct, although harmful and evil
in itself and not justified by special circumstances, may nonetheless be appropriately
subjected to acquittal since the criminal law has a special commitment to punishing
only the blameworthy. Id. at 58. Excuses ("defenses") include (1) insanity, (2) immaturity, (3) necessity, (4) duress, and (5) mistake of fact/law. Insanity, necessity, and
duress also can be affirmative defenses. For example, an actor who is acting involuntarily; who is insane, involuntarily intoxicated, or immature; or who is acting under
duress or under a reasonable mistake of law or mistake as to justification may be
blameless. See id.
21 See id. A blameworthy actor may be acquitted if he satisfies the requirements of
a nonexculpatory defense. While such defenses are disfavored, they further societal
interests that are judged to be more important than punishing the offender at hand.
Diplomatic immunity is one example of such a defense. See id. at 58-59.
22 Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1551, 1558 n.21 (1999) (quoting GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978)) (arguing that an action is justified if, and only if, it is permitted
by the best moral theory, regardless of the beliefs of the actor).
23 The information in this Part, including the "Paradigm of Individual
Responsibility," regarding elemental analyses is ably articulated in Matthew T. Fricker
& Kelly Gilchrist, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18 U.S.C § 207: The Need
for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of FederalCriminalLaw, 65 NOTRE DAME
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elemental analysis, it is helpful to have at hand a formula that might
24
well be characterized as a "Paradigm of Individual Responsibility."
The first element is "who" is accused of the offense. Is it a person? A
group or entity? A corporation? Any combination of these?2 5 The
second step is to resolve what "conduct" has been alleged against the
L. REv. 803, 822-31 (1990). It stems from work on the proposed federal criminal
code. See generally S. REP. No. 97-307 (1981).
24 A basic element analysis of the crime of "vehicular homicide" illustrates the
paradigm. Because statutes vary from state to state as to the elements of this crime,
the vehicular homicide statute for the State of Iowa is here used for the sake of example: "Homicide or serious injury by vehicle. 1. A p6rson commits a class 'C' felony
when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by ... the following
means: ... b. Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property...." IowA CODE ANN. § 707.6A (West
1993).
Elements of the Offense of Vehicular Homicide:
person (actor)
State of Mind of Actor
Conduct:
driving
recklessness; with
willful or wanton
disregard
Attendant
motor vehicle
recklessness
Circumstances:
- persons or
property
Result:
death
recklessness
Who:

Historically, American "law has grouped a variety of acts, circumstances, and results together in a fashion that obscures their distinctions, and referred to the assemblage by a single name." Ronald L. Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 575, 588-89 (1988). Regular and consistent use of precise drafting conventions, denoting plainly what is conduct, what is a circumstance,
and what is a result, could produce a much higher degree of exactitude and would
not commingle conduct and result. See id. at 589. The crime of "murder" (the unlawful killing of any human being with malice aforethought) is the prime example of the
application of the Paradigm of Individual Responsibility showing that "kill" is a single
word that performs two functions (conduct and result), as illustrated below:
Elements of the Offense of Murder:
Who:
person (actor)
State of Mind of Actor
Conduct:
kill
intent to kill with
malice aforethought
Attendant
human being
-4
knowledge
Circumstances:
Result:
kill
-4
intent to kill
(N.B. A detailed elemental analysis of the " Hate Crime Statute" discussed in Apprendi
may be found in the Appendix of this Comment.)
25 For example, if the word "whoever" appears in a statute, that statute applies to
any person as well as to any corporation. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (providing
definition of "whoever").
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actor (i.e., determine the "what" or the "actus reus"). For example, in
a basic murder statute, the conduct referred to would be "to kill."
The third part of the analysis should be consideration of the attendant
circumstances. That is, facts exist surrounding the alleged offense
that may be relevant to application of the statute. Attendant circumstances may be considered in light of "liability" (e.g., "right/wrong"
from the perpetrator's perspective), 'Jurisdiction" (state or federal),
"grading" (high/low, e.g., petty or grand larceny based on the value
stolen, from the victim's perspective), "venue" (where tried; e.g.,
S.D.N.Y. or D.D.C.), and "law" (e.g., theory from books rather than
empirical observations). The fourth element to be determined is the
"result," if any, required by the statute. Using a basic murder statute,
the result referred to would be "kill."
Finally, the "state of mind" ("mens rea") of the actor must be
determined regarding each of the four sections of the Paradigm of
Individual Responsibility that are set forth above (i.e., as to each element). The various states of mind to be applied (with the exception
of strict liability crimes) include purpose ("intent"), knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.2 6 A well-written statute will include, in either the particular law itself or in the "Definitions" section at the
beginning of each related series of laws, specific mention of the
state (s) of mind intended by the legislature as it drafted the respective
law. Each element of an offense should be considered separately with
respect to the state of mind, 27 This will typically give rise to a syntactical ambiguity. 28 Under the common law, a crime could "generally

[be] constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind...
[and] an evil doing hand ....

29

While the requirement of conduct

in American criminal law is a matter of constitutional due process, the
state of mind requirement is a question of legislative intent.30 Indeed,
federal law does not have common-law crimes.3 1 Moreover, since
26 Basic definitions of these states of mind are: "intent/purpose" is to "engage in
some conduct with the purpose of. ..."; "knowledge" is a conscious awareness, or the
total or range of what has been perceived or learned; "reckless" is conscious risktaking; and "negligence" exists when the defendant "should have known ...
27 See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 1621.
28 See id. (citation omitted). For example, what does the state of mind of "knowingly" modify in the phrase "knowingly sells a security without a permit"? As a matter
of grammar, it is not at all clear how far down the sentence the word "knowingly"
travels in what it modifies-hence, a syntactical ambiguity arises. See id. (citation
omitted).
29 Id. at 1617 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980),
and Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
30 Id. at 1620.
31 See id. at 1620 n.19.
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Congress typically drafts legislation against a common-law background, strict liability becomes an exception-and silence is not
enough to infer that Congress intended strict liability. 32 If a statute is
silent as to state of mind, typically a state of mind is read into the
34 the
statute3 3 based on general principles of statutory construction,
3 5 or a non-MPC principle. 3 6
Model Penal Code (MPC) principle,
B.

37
Sentencing in General

Apprendi indeed "shifted the tectonic plates insofar as criminal
sentencing is concerned."38 To understand the magnitude of Apprendi's affect, an understanding of sentencing is required.
The basic outline of the sentencing process is as follows:
32 Id. at 1621-22.
33 A state's criminal code introductory section on guidance should be checked to
see if it sets out rules for "reading in" states of mind. For example, regarding silence
as to state of mind in a New Jersey statute, the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice
specifically states that "[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the
culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section" [i.e., "knowledge"]. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2-2(c) (3) (West 1995).
34 The modem federal principle of statutory construction provides the following
regarding state of mind: Conduct is "knowing" (i.e., "with knowledge"); Surrounding
Circumstances: Liability is "knowing"; Jurisdiction is "strict"; Grading is "strict"; Law is
"strict/knowledge"; Result is "knowing/knowledge"; and Affirmative Defenses are to
be implied. See Fricker & Gilchrist, supra note 23, at 822-31.
35 The MPC principle of statutory construction provides the following regarding
state of mind: "Conduct," "Result," and "Surrounding Circumstances," including
those used for grading, but not venue or jurisdiction, are "reckless" unless expressly
stated otherwise. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) explanatory note on section (Official
Draft & Explanatory Notes 1962).
36 States that use a non-MPC principle of statutory construction should delineate
in a clear and unambiguous manner within their statutes the states of mind that the
legislatures desire the courts to employ. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 1571.
Typical states of mind required in such states for elements of common-law felonies
are conduct is "intent"; surrounding circumstances is "knowledge"; and result is
"intent."
37 Sentencing can, depending on the applicable law and the facts of each
individual case, involve the imposition of anything from probation to confinement to
capital punishment. "Confinement" is common to both the civil and criminal
systems. While an in-depth discussion of the rationale for confinement is outside the
scope of this work, a thorough discussion of the traditional rationales for
confinement may be found at Katherine P. Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil
Commitment ofDangerousSex Offenders Is an AppropriateLegal Compromise Between "Mad"
and "Bad'---AStudy of Minnesota's Sexual PsychopathicPersonalityStatute, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETmICS & PUB. POL'y 227, 244-51 (1996).

38 United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 123 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70
U.S.L.W. 3237 (2001).

1214

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

77:4

[If a criminal] defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, the
judge will enter a judgment of conviction and set the case for sentencing. The structure of the sentence and the discretion of the
judge in choosing among sentencing alternatives will be controlled
by statute. For misdemeanors a judge ordinarily has discretion to
impose a fine, probation, suspended sentence, or fixed jail term not
to exceed a statutorily prescribed maximum. For felony offenses,
the choice ordinarily is between imprisonment and probation although the legislature is likely to have prohibited probation for
some offenses.... [Some states] require that the sentence be indeterminate, i.e., the court sets a minimum and maximum term, with
the parole board determining the actual release date between the
minimum and maximum. . . . In recent years, many states have
moved from indeterminate to determinate prison sentences for
most felonies. Under determinate sentencing, the judge sets a single fixed term of imprisonment, which must fall within a fairly narrow range set by the legislature for the particular crime. This
sentencing structure eliminates earlier parole release except for limited good-behavior credits. 9
And "[i] n cases tried without a jury, the judge, of course, determines the sentence to be imposed. ' 40 Injury cases, however, the practice varies among the states. Most of them limit the jury function to a
determination of guilt or innocence and permit the judge to assign
41
the penalty.
Criminal law statutes are drafted with great care to make the assignment of liability a matter of rules rather than one of judicial discretion. 42 This enduring "commitment to the articulation of liability
rules, called the principle of legality, has always been a foundation of
Anglo-American criminal law."' 43 Some commentators, however, feel
that the sentencing process is highly discretionary in determining
39

ROBINSON,

supra note 14, at 14-15 (quoting
1.4(o) (1985)).

WAYNE

R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.

ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §

40 ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 10 (5th
ed. 1992).
41 See id. For murder and rape, however, most states place both responsibilities
upon the jury. See id.
42 See ROBINSON, supranote 14, at 59. Indeed, "[i]n a democracy, the legislature,
which is the most representative branch of government, is generally thought to be the
proper body to exercise the criminalization decision. This rationale directly supports
the prohibition ofjudicial creation of offenses and the abolition ofjudicially created
offenses." PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 79 (1997).
43 ROBINSON, supranote 14, at 59. The traditional statement of the legality principle provides, "[N] ullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege." (Roughly: "No crime
without law; no punishment without law," or "No conduct may be held criminal unless it is precisely described in a penal law.") See id. at 117.
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punishment.44 Professor Paul H. Robinson 45 succinctly lays out his
position on the issue by asking: "If unguided discretion is carefully
avoided in the liability assignment process, why is it tolerated in sentencing, where the punishment is in large part determined?" 4 6 This
question is further explored in detail throughout this Comment.
C. Sentencing Reform Act of 198447 (FederalSentencing Guidelines)
Prior to the most recent wave of sentencing reform, the federal
and state governments "employed indeterminate-sentencing schemes
in which judges and executive branch officials (e.g., parole board officials) had substantial discretion to determine the actual length of a
defendant's sentence." 48 Nevertheless, studies of indeterminate sentencing schemes found that similarly situated defendants often received widely disparate sentences. 49 It was discovered that, while
"indeterminate sentencing" was intended to soften the uniform and
often harsh sentences formerly imposed under mandatory sentencing
schemes, the indeterminate sentencing actually had the opposite effect. 50 Congress and state legislatures responded to this by shifting to
44 See, e.g., id. at 60.
45 Professor Robinson is a Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of
Law. He is the author of numerous textbooks and articles related to criminal law.
Further, he served in the mid-1980s as one of the seven original commissioners on the
United States Sentencing Commission. See generally id.; DISSENTING VIEW OF COMMISSIONER PAUL H. ROBINSON ON THE PROMULGATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES BY THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (1987) [hereinafter DISSENTING VIEW].

46

ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 60. Professor Robinson adds,
In assessing whether to impose liability, and what grade of liability to impose,
the criminal law follows fixed and specific rules that allow little discretion;
the legality principle is well preserved. In the determination of an offender's sentence,however, it is common to have few or no rules and to allow
broad judicial discretion. It is unclear whether this dramatic difference is
justifiable.... If the distribution of punishment is to be discretionary at the
sentencing stage, society has benefited little from the strict adherence to
legality at the liability assignment stage. It is in part for this reason that the
current wave of sentencing reform introduces articulated rules and significantly reduces sentencing discretion.
ROBINSON, supra note 42, at 83-84.
47 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). For the sake of simplicity and
clarity, these materials do not attempt to provide an overview of the sentencing
guidelines of individual states that have chosen to adopt such a system. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provide a reasonably adequate and necessary framework
within which the issue of "who decides what a 'crime' is" may be effectively analyzed.
48 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 549 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"determinate sentencing" schemes that aimed to limit the sentencing
discretion of judges and therefore provide equal treatment to simi51
larly situated defendants.
The United States Congress created the most well known of these
reforms when it passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.52 In do-

ing so, Congress committed the federal system to rationality and consistency in criminal sentencing, 53 commencing November 1, 198754
the effective date of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Then-Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer authored an article in 1988
that provides the background necessary to understand the Guidelines
and the task the United States Sentencing Commission faced when
they drafted the Guidelines, as well as the kinds of compromise that
are embodied in the final Version of the Guidelines.5 5 Congress had
two primary purposes when it enacted the new Sentencing Reform
Act. The first was "honesty in sentencing," which "meant to end the
previous system whereby ajudge might sentence an offender to twelve
years, but the Parole Commission could release him after four....
[T]his system sometimes fooled the judges, sometimes disappointed
the offender, and often mislead the public."56 The new law ensured
that the sentence the judge gave was the sentence the offender would
serve. 57 Congress's second purpose was to reduce "unjustifiably wide"
sentencing disparities in which, for example, punishments for identical actual cases could range from three years to twenty years
58
imprisonment.
To effectuate its intent in the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress
created the United States Sentencing Commission, 59 of which nowJustice Breyer was an original member.60 The Commission followed
51 See id. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53 See DISSENTING VIEW, supranote 45, at 2. The Senate voted 91 to 1 on this Act,
and the House voted 316 to 91. Id. The statutory authority of the Commission is
codified in Chapter 58 of Title 28, United States Code; the related statutory authority
for sentencing is codified in Chapters 227 and 229 of Title 18, United States Code.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS app. B
(1987).
54 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1988).
55 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
56 Id. at 4.
57 See id.
5$ See id. at 4-5.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Justice Breyer is one of the four dissenters in the Apprendi decision. See infra
note 260 and accompanying text.
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two principles throughout the period in which it drafted the Guidelines. First, regarding the creation of categories and determination of
sentence lengths, the Comission followed typical past practice, determined by an analysis of 10,000 actual cases. 61 Second, the Commission remained cognizant throughout the drafting process that
Congress intended it to be a permanent body that continuously would
revise the Guidelines over the years. 62 Overall, the ultimate goal of
the Commission was to create a rational and consistent sentencing system. The guideline range of imprisonment for each combination of
offense and offender characteristic was to be narrow, "the top of
which range cannot exceed the bottom by more than twenty-five
63
percent."
The Sentencing Commission was urged by some to adopt a controlling principle or rationale for punishment from among those invoked in classical penal law: deterrence, incapacitation, retribution,
and rehabilitation. 64 The Commission declined to do so to avoid impeding the general acceptability of the Guidelines; the Commission
did, however, resolve certain other policy issues. 65 For example, the
Commission believed that a "charge offense" sentencing (the conduct
corresponding to thd material elements of the crimes of which defendants have been convicted or to which they plead guilty) was more
attainable than a real offense sentencing (the actual conduct in which
defendants engaged, regardless of the charges on which they were indicted or convicted).66 Nevertheless, the Guidelines have certain elements of reality. For example, "it has utilized generic conduct rather
than the elements of a multiplicity of narrow federal criminal law statutes."67 Further, the Guidelines also reflect important real offense elements commonly encountered, such as the actor's role in the
commission of an offense, the presence of firearms, and the amount
68
of money taken.
The second basic policy adopted by the Sentencing Commission
dealt with judicial freedom to depart from guideline sentences. 69 The
61
62

See Breyer, supra note 55, at 7.
See id. at 7-8.

63 Id. at 5.
64 SeeJOHN S. BAYER, JR. ET AL., HALL'S CuimnNAL LAW 887 (5th ed. 1993). For an
in depth discussion of the rationale for punishment, see generally Blakey, supra note
37, at 244-51.
65 See BAKER ET AL., supra note 64, at 887.
66 See id.

67 Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING
68
69

COMM'N,

See id. at 887-88 (citation omitted).
See id. at 888.

supra note 53, at 1.5-.6 (West 1993)).
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Commission recognized that "in many instances, it will be appropriate

that the court consider the actual conduct of the offender, even when
such conduct does not constitute an element of the offense." 70 In
acknowledging the occasional need for departures, the Commission
wrote,
[This] sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline-specified sentence only when it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. . . that was not adequately taken into
consideration .. .". [see] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).... The Commission

intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out
a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that
each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one
to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider
71
whether a departure is warranted.
70 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supranote 53, at 1.14-.15 (1987). Final Draft [hereinafter F.D.] section 1B1.3, entitled "Relevant Conduct," provides:
(a) Unless otherwise specified under the guidelines, conduct and circumstances relevant to the offense of conviction means: acts or omissions
committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or by a person for
whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable, that (1) are part of
the same course of conduct, or a common scheme or plan, as the offense of conviction, or (2) are relevant to the defendant's state of mind
or motive in committing the offense of conviction, or (3) indicate the
defendant's degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a
livelihood.
(b) Injury relevant to the offense of conviction means harm which is caused
intentionally, recklessly or by criminal negligence in the course of conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.
Id. at 1.15.
71 Id. at 1.6 (1987); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Commissioner Robinson, however, points out that despite the "Relevant Conduct" provision
that may suggest that the Guidelines take into account most aspects of the offender's
conduct, the only factors or conduct that a judge is permitted to take into account
under the Guidelines are those specifically listed in the applicable guideline section.
See DISSENTING VIEW, supra note 45, at 8 (referencing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra
note 53, F.D. § 1B1.1 ("Application Instructions") steps (a)-(c)). As an example,
because the burglary guideline does not specifically aggravate the guideline
sentence where the offender causes physical injury, the burglar who beats a
homeowner will be treated the same as the burglar who does not. That is,
the beating of the homeowner is "free" in burglary, as it is in a host of other
offenses.
Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 53, F.D. § 2B2.1 ("Burglary of a Residence"). Indeed, a bank robber might or might not use a gun; he might take a little,
or a lot, of money; he might, or might not, injure the teller. Yet the typical armed
robbery statute does not distinguish among these different ways of committing the
crime. See Breyer, supra note 55, at 9. The judge must depart from the Guidelines to

0 WHO DECIDES

. 20021

WHAT

CONSTITUTES

A CRIME?"

1219

. Overall, judges were to be bound by the Guidelines unless there
existed an unusual factor in a case that "was not adequately taken into
consideration" by the Commission in drafting the Guidelines. 72 Such
an occurrence was to be rare, because the Guidelines were drafted to
73
take into account "every important factor relevant to sentencing."
D.

Determination of Punishment: Applying a "Crime" to a
Sentencing Guideline

After applying these working definitions and analytical tools (assuming that both an effective elemental analysis is performed on a
particular criminal statute and that the government believes it can
prove each and every element of an offense 74 ), legislatively-created
sentencing Guidelines may then be considered. Within these Guidelines, particular offense characteristics are often specified to establish
the seriousness of the offense. 75 When present in a case, particular
offense characteristics require an adjustment in the offense level. For
example, the robbery guideline in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
provides "a 3-level increase if a firearm was possessed, a 5-level increase if a firearm was discharged, a 6-level increase if life-threatening
bodily injury occurred, and an increase of zero to seven levels dependtake account of physical injury caused during such offenses as burglary, escape, prison
riot, and aircraft piracy. See DISSENTING VIEW, supra note 45, at 14 n.48. Commissioner Robinson also pointed out that by inviting departures rather than incorporating all relevant sentencing factors into the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission
violated its statutory mandate and invited disparity. See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINNa. L.
REv. 403, 424 n.87 (1993) (discussing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' approach to
real-offense sentencing).
72 DISSENTING VIEW, supra note 45, at 2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
73 Id. (citing S. RP. No. 98-225, at 169 (1983)). Nevertheless, Commissioner
Robinson believes that
[the guidelines] are neither comprehensive nor binding. [They] ignore
many factors important to sentencing, fail to provide a guideline for many
offenses (including all offenses committed by organizations), frequently fail
to provide definitions of terms and criteria for sentencing factors, and provide extensive invitations-indeed, directions-to judges to depart from the
guidelines. As a result, there may be as much disparity under these guidelines as there was without guidelines.
Id. at 12.
74 For the sake of clarity in the following explanation of how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines work, this caveat puts aside for the moment the central issues in contention within Apprendi, which are who should determine the precise elements
necessary to constitute a particular "crime" and what exactly those elements are.
75 See NORAN ABRAMS & SARA S. BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LA-W AND ITS ENFORCEMENT

702 (3d ed. 2000).
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ing on the value of the property taken." 76 Jurisdictions differ, however, in what they regard as elements of specific crimes. To put these
crucial differences in context, it is necessary to examine several prominent Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate the recent evolution
in the Court's jurisprudence of what constitutes a "crime." These
cases influenced the Apprendi Court in varying manners and helped to
mold the current constitutional framework for the federal criminal
law.
E.
1.

Background Cases Necessary To UnderstandApprendi

Williams v. New York

Over fifty years ago, the Court held in Williams v. New York77 that
"determination of evidentiary relevance at sentencing hearings was
solely within the discretion of the sentencing judge" and that "[t] his
evidentiary latitude . . .even extend[ed] to the consideration of al-

leged but unproven prior criminal acts."7 8 Justice Black wrote the
Court's opinion that upheld a death sentence based on factors that
were outside the record presented in the trial. 79 The Williams Court
"reasoned that individualized sentencing requires judges to have access to all relevant information."8 0 While "[this stance was not remarkable in the rehabilitative penological climate of the 1940's [sic],"
"[t]he effect of Williams ...was to diminish the importance of a defendant's conviction offense."8 1 For example, "[a] defendant charged
with armed robbery, but convicted by ajury of theft, may later be sentenced as if he had been convicted of armed robbery. The conviction
82
offense, therefore, [had] little, if any, relevance to sentencing."
2.

In re Winship

While the narrow issue the Court faced in the seminal case of In
re Winship8 3 was "whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among
the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required during the
adjudicatory stage when ajuvenile is charged with an act which would
76

Id.

77 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
78

See Michael H. Tonry, CriminalLaw: The MissingElement in Sentencing Reform, 35

L. REV.607, 625 (1982).
79 See Williams, 337 U.S. at 251-52.
80 Tonry, supra note 78, at 625 (citing Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).

VAND.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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constitute a crime if committed by an adult,"8 4 the Court used Winship

to establish the important principle that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the
crime" for which any. defendant may be charged. 85 Noting that "[t] he
requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a
Nation,"8 6 the Court emphasized that "[t]hese rules are historically
grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty
and property."87 This reasonable doubt standard has certainly
"play[ed] a vital role in American criminal procedure" and has been
"a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
88
factual error."
3.

Mullaney v. Wilbur

The landmark case of Mullaney v. Wilbur8 9 expanded the protections afforded in Winship and held that the government may not shift
the burden of proof on elements of an offense. 90 The issue the Court
faced in Mullaney was whether the Maine rule requiring a defendant
"to prove that he acted 'in the heat of passion on sudden provocation' .... comports with the due process requirement, as defined in
In re Winship, that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." 91 While
"[m]any states impose different statutory sentences on different degrees of assault," in Maine, for example, the "prosecution must prove
elements of aggravation in criminal assault cases by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."9 2 The Mullaney Court pointed out that Winship
emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] vital
role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the uncertainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction....
84

Id. at 359.

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 364.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
See id. at 703-04.

92

Id. at 684-85 (citation omitted).
Id. at 699 n.24 (citing State v. Ferris, 249 A.2d 523 (Me. 1969)).
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Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moralforce of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standardof proofthat leaves people in doubt whether
93
innocent people are being condemned.
The Court recognized that "this is often a heavy burden for the
prosecution to satisfy.... [b]ut this is the traditional burden which
our system of criminal justice deems essential."9 4 The Court in Mullaney stated that it was "an intolerable result" to require
a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it
95
is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence.
Therefore, the Due Process Clause requires that the government
may not shift the burden of proof on elements of an offense.
4.

Patterson v. New York

Nevertheless, Pattersonv. New York96 reached a result complementary to, yet distinguishable from, Mullaney based on one important factor. The Supreme Court held that the government is allowed to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant on an affirmative defense.9 7 Defendant Patterson was convicted of killing his estranged wife's paramour. 98 His jury was instructed under the applicable New York state
law that "the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence." 99 The majority wrote that
"a State must [not] prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the
existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of punishment.'10 0 Overall, a state's decision with
93

Id. at 700-01 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64) (emphasis added).

94 Id. at 701.
95 Id. at 703.
96 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
97 See id. at 206-09. See supra note 19 for a thorough discussion of affirmative
defenses and their role in an advanced criminology.
98

Patterson,432 U.S. at 198-200.

99 Id. at 200. The jury was further told that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Patterson had intentionally killed his wife's lover but that Patterson had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find Patterson guilty of manslaughter rather
than murder. Id.
100 Id. at 207 (emphasis added). The Court went on to add:
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respect to its criminal procedures is "not subject to proscription under
the Due Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."" 0 '
5.

McMillan v. Pennsylvania

Only sixteen years ago, McMillan v. Pennsylvania10 2 held that a
court may use the preponderance of evidence standard when considering a sentencing factor.' 0 3 This holding directly contrasts with Apprendi, Which held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."'1 4 The Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act' 0 5 provided that anyone convicted of certain enumerated
felonies was subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five
years if the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense. 10 6 The Act specifically incorporated the
statement that "[p]rovisions of this section shall not be an element of
the crime."'1 7 Defendant McMillan shot a person after an argument
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case
is "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The social cost
of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free. While it is clear
that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to
protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without limits; and Mr. Justice Harlan's aphorism provides little guidance for
determining what those limits are. Due process does not require that every

conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent person. Punishment of those found guilty by ajury,
for example, is not forbidden merely because there is a remote possibility in
some instances that an innocent person might go to jail.

Id. at 208.
101 Id. at 201-02.
102 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The McMillan majority consisted of Justices Rehnquist,
White, Powell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Marshall, Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens were in dissent.
103 See id. at 84-91.
104 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466,.490 (2000).
105 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
106 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-81.
107 Id. at 81 n.1 (emphasis added).
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over a debt and was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault.1 08 He
and his fellow petitioners appealed on the basis that "visible possession of a firearm [was] an element of the crimes for which they were
being sentenced and thus must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
under In Re Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur."10 9 Yet the McMillan
Court looked to Patterson,which "rejected the claim that whenever a
state links the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or absence of
an identified fact' the state must prove that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt." 110 In fact, "Patterson stressed that in determining what facts
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive."'
The
Court believed that Patterson,rather than Mullaney, controlled the McMillan case. 112 The majority looked with approval upon the Pennsylvania legislature's express determination that "visible possession of
a firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in the mandatory
sentencing statute," but rather "a sentencingfactor that comes into play
only after the defendant has been found guilty of one of those crimes
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 1 3 The Pennsylvania statute "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create[d]
a separate offense"-it merely "limit[ed] the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it
without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. 11 4 Indeed, "[t1he statute gives no impression of having been tailored to
permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of
the substantive offense." 1 5
The battle in Apprendi was foreshadowed in McMillan as that
Court stated,
Petitioners' claim that visible possession under the Pennsylvania
statute is "really" an element of the offenses for which they are being punished-that Pennsylvania has in effect defined a new set of
upgraded felonies-would have at least more superficial appeal if a
finding of visible possession exposed them to greater or additional
punishment but it does not."I 6
108 Id. Defendant McMillan was one of four petitioners appealing the Pennsylvania Act in question. The cases were consolidated upon appeal. See id. at 82-83.
109 Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
110 Id. at 84.
111 Id. at 85.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 87-88.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
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Toward the end of the majority's opinion, the Court proclaimed,
'We have no doubt that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentenc17
ing Act falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line.""
That statement that would prove to be ominously portentous of the
Apprendi decision only a few years later.
6.

Almendarez-Torres v. United States

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States,n 8 the defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after having been previously deported following his conviction of aggravated felonies." 9 He
appealed, arguing that "an indictment must set forth all the elements
of a crime," "that his indictment had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions," and that, consequently, the district court
should not have sentenced him to more than "the maximum authorized for an offender without an earlier conviction."' 20 The Court held
that while "[a] n indictment must set forth each element of the crime
that it charges ....

it need not set forth factors relevant only to the

sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime." 2 1 In
fact, "[w] ithin limits, the question of which factors are which is normally a matter for Congress."' 22 The Court then turned to the statute
under which Almendarez-Torres was sentenced to determine if Congress intended the presence of an earlier conviction as a separate
crime or as a sentencing factor that might be used to increase punishment.123 To answer this question, the Court "look[ed] to the statute's
language, structure, subject matter, context, and history-factors that
typically help courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illu-

minate its text."'

24

Analyzing the statute in light of these factors, the

117

Id. at 91 (emphasis added).

118

523 U.S. 224 (1998). Almendarez-Torreswas a 5-4 decision, withJustices Breyer,

O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and the ChiefJustice joining. Justices Scalia, Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.

119
120

Id. at 227.
Id.

121 Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
122 Id. (referencing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994) (citation
omitted) (holding that "the definition of a criminal offense [is] entrusted to the legislature 'particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute'"
(quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))). The limits to which
the Court here referred are found in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,477 U.S. 79, 84-91
(1986) (discussed supra notes 102-17). In McMillan, the Court specifically refused to
define the limits to which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.

123 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228.
124 Id.
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Court first noted that the relevant subject matter of the statute was
recidivism 25 and then found that Congress intended to set forth a
sentencing factor in the relevant statute rather than to set forth a separate criminal offense. 126 After reviewing and balancing the rationales and holdings of several of its precedent cases, including Winship,
Mullaney, Patterson,and McMillan, the Court found no significant support for the proposition that the Constitution forbids legislative au127
thorization of a longer sentence for recidivism.
7. Jones v. United States
The holding in Jones v. United States128 was a precursor to the Ap-

prendi holding only a year later. In Jones, the Court put boundaries on
the Almendarez-Torres holding by stating that, based on the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment, any fact other than recidivism
that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be included in
129
an indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
1
30
The Jones Court examined the pertinent carjacking statute and decided that the "if death results" and "if serious bodily injury results"
clauses were elements of the statute. 13 1 The Court also held that
states may not get around due process limitations of Winship by not
presenting to juries facts that increase the severity of the possible penalty.13 2 Finally, the Jones Court held that the classification of recidivism as a sentencing factor was an exception from the general rule
that every fact that might expand the statutory maximum penalty
3
range must be determined by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3
125
126
127

See id. at 230.
See id. at 235.
See id. at 240-46.

128 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
129 See id. at 243 n.6.
130 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993). The statute then read as follows:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate
or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-(1) be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious bodily
injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title...) results, be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 25 years or both, and (3) if death results,
be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or
both ....
Id. (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1999)).
131 Jones, 526 U.S. at 235-36.
132 See id. at 240-41.
133

See id. at 248-49.
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APPRENDi v. NEW JERSEY

A.

Background

34
1. The Statute'

The New Jersey statute classifying as a second-degree offense the
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose' 35 provides for imprisonment of "between five years and 10 years."'13 6 A separate statute,
known as a "hate crime" law, provides for an "extended term" of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity."'1

7

The extended term for such second-degree offenses is "be-

38
tween 10 and 20 years."'

2.

The Facts

In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, Charles C.
Apprendi,Jr. fired several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all
white area of Vineland, NewJersey. 39 He was arrested shortly thereafter and only an hour after the incident admitted that he had been the
shooter. 40 After further questioning, "he made a statement-which
he later retracted-that even though he did not know the occupants
of the house personally, 'because they are black in color he [did] not
want them in the neighborhood."141
3.

Procedural History
a.

New Jersey Trial Court

Subsequently, a New Jersey grand jury returned a twenty-three
count indictment against Apprendi that alleged shootings on four dif134 A complete reproduction of the applicable statutes and the hate crime
enhancement is found in the Appendix. Additionally, a full elemental analysis of this
statute is provided in the Appendix.
135 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000) (referencing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)).
136 Id. (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a) (2) (West 1995)).
137 Id. at 468-69 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995)).
138 Id. at 469 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a) (3) (West 1995)).
139 Id.
140 1& A subsequent search of Apprendi's home uncovered a .22-caliber rifle and
an anti-personnel bomb. See State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (NJ. 1999).
141 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 (citing Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486).
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ferent dates and "the unlawful possession of various weapons. None
of the counts referred to the hate crime statute, and none alleged that
Apprendi acted with a racially biased purpose." 4 2 The parties entered into a plea agreement in which Apprendi pled guilty to two
counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of the third-degree offense of unlawful possession
of an anti-personnel bomb. 14 3 The remaining counts were dismissed.' 4 4 As part of the plea agreement, however, the state reserved
the right to request the court to impose a higher "enhanced" sentence
on the count related to the December 22 shooting on the ground that
the offense was committed with a biased purpose under the hate
crime statute.' 45 Apprendi, in turn, "reserved the right to challenge
the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it violates
the United States Constitution."1 46 The maximum sentence that Apprendi faced on the three counts in the absence of the hate crime
statute was twenty years in total. 14 7 If the judge enhanced the sen-

tence based on the hate crime statute, the count related to the December 22 shooting alone would be twenty years, and the maximum
of the three counts in aggregate would be thirty years, with a fifteen
year period of parole ineligibility. 14 8 After the trial judge accepted the
three guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a motion for an extended
term.' 49 The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
Apprendi's "purpose" in the shooting.' 50 After hearing from a psychologist and numerous character witnesses, as well as from Apprendi
himself, the trial judge concluded that the evidence supported a finding "that the crime was motivated by racial bias."'15 1 Determining "'by
a preponderance of the evidence' that Apprendi's actions were taken
'with a purpose to intimidate' as provided by the statute, the trial
judge held that the hate crime enhancement applied.' 5 2 The judge
rejected Apprendi's constitutional challenge to the hate crime statute
and sentenced him to a twelve year term for the December 22 shooting, and to shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts. 155
142

Id.

143
144
145
146

Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.

147

Id.

148
149
150
151
152
153

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471; see also id. at 470.
Id. at 471 (citation omitted).
Id.
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New Jersey Appellate Court

Apprendi appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, arguing "that the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon
which his hate crime statute was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 4 Over dissent, that court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania 55
and found that the state legislature decided to make the hate crime
enhancement a "sentencing factor," as opposed to "an element of an
underlying offense-and that decision was within the State's established power to define the elements of its crimes."' 56 The appellate
court also found that the hate crime statute did not create a presumption of guilt and did not appear "tailored to permit the.., finding to
be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."'1 7 That court
characterized the required finding as one of "motive" and described it
as a traditional "sentencing factor" that was not considered an essential element of any crime unless the legislature so provides.' 58 Although it recognized that the hate crime law did indeed expose
defendants to "greater and additional punishment,"' 5 9 the appellate
court held that this "one factor standing alone" was not sufficient to
60
render the statute unconstitutional.
c.

New Jersey Supreme Court

A divided NewJersey Supreme Court began its affirmation of the
appellate court by explaining that while due process only requires the
government
to prove the "elements" of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
the mere fact that a state legislature has placed a criminal component "within the sentencing provisions" of the criminal code "does
154 Id. Defendant Apprendi was relying on the Supreme Court's holding in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), fully discussed supra notes 83-88 and accompanying
text.
155 477 U.S. 79 (1986). McMillan is discussed fully supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
156 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
157 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. Apprendi, 698 A-2d 1265, 1269 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997) (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88)).
158 Id. at 471-72 (quoting Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1270).
159 Id. at 472 (quoting Apprend 698 A.2d at 1269 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at
88)).
160 See id. (quoting Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1269).
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not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an
essential element of the offense." 161
Nor "could the constitutional question be settled simply by defining
the hate crime statute's 'purpose to intimidate' as 'motive' and
thereby excluding the provision from any traditional conception of an
'element' of a crime."1 62 Even if one characterized the language that
way, and the court doubted that such a characterization was accurate,
"proof of motive did not ordinarily 'increase the penal consequences
to an actor.' Such '[I]abels,' . . . would not yield an answer to Ap1 63
prendi's constitutional question."
While taking judicial notice of the United States Supreme Court's
1999 decision in Jones v. United States164 that cast serious doubt on the
constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhancing findings to be determined by ajudge by a preponderance of the evidence, the court con16 5
cluded that those doubts were not essential to the holding in Jones.
The state supreme court then relied on McMillan, as the appellate
court had, as well as Almendarez-Torres v. United States 66 to hold the
hate crime statute valid. 167 The majority found that rather than allowing impermissible burden shifting and creating "a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty . . . 'the Legislature simply took one
factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment and dictated the weight to be given that factor.' ,6' The
majority recognized that the hate crime statute was unlike that in McMillan only so far as it increased the maximum penalty to which a
defendant could be subject. 16 9 But the court continued that "it was
not clear that this difference alone would 'change the constitutional
calculus,' especially where, as here, 'there is rarely any doubt whether
the defendants committed the crimes with the purpose of intimidating the victim on the basis of race or ethnicity." 70 Additionally, in
light of concerns to avoid "punishing thought itself," the enhancement served as an appropriate balance between those concerns and a
161
162

Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 492) (emphases added).
Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 492).

163

Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 492).

164

526 U.S. 227 (1999). Jones is discussed fully supranotes 128-33 and accompa-

nying text.
165 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472-73.
166 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Almendarez-Torres is discussed fully supra notes 118-27
and accompanying text.
167 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 473.
168 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 494-95) (emphasis added).

169
170

See id.
Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 495).
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state's compelling interest in vindicating the right "to be free of invidi17
ous discrimination." '
The dissent believed
instead that the case turned on two critical characteristics: (1) "[A]
defendant's mental state in committing the subject offense ... nec-

essarily involves a finding so integral to the charged offense that it
must be characterized as an element thereof'; and (2) "the significantly increased sentencing range triggered by... the finding of a
purpose to intimidate" means that the purpose "must be treated as a
material element [that] must be found by a jury beyond a reasona172
ble doubt."
The dissent was convinced that "there can be little doubt that the
sentencing factor applied to this defendant-the purpose to intimidate a victim because of race-must fairly be regarded as an element
of the crime requiring inclusion in the indictment and proof beyond
173
a reasonable doubt."
B.

The United States Supreme Court Decision

1. The Majority Opinion' 7 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 75 and reversed. In writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens stated that
the issue presented was whether defendant Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt
176
whether he was motivated by racial bias in committing his crime.
The answer to that question, according to Justice Stevens, was foreshadowed in Jones v. United States' 77 in which the Court noted that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.178
171
172
173

Id. (quoting Apprend4 731 A.2d at 495).
Id. (quoting Apprend4 731 A.2d at 498 (Stein, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 474 (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 512 (Stein, J., dissenting)).

174 Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg.
175 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
176 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475-76 (2000).
177 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
178 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).

1232

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VCOL. 77:4

Applying this reasoning to Apprendi's case, the majority held "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case in179
volving a state statute."
The Supreme Court believed that at stake in Apprendi were "constitutional protections of surpassing importance," including proscription of any deprivation of liberty without due process of law and the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.18 0 The Court
continued, "' [T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."' 18 1 The Court
stated that these principles had a historical foundation extending for
centuries. 182 Furthermore, "the demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times ... [and] is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the
measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the
trier of all the essential elements of guilt."'183 Justice Stevens further

noted that "[a]ny possible distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed
during the years surrounding our Nation's founding."'184
Like Justice Thomas, who devoted a large part of his concurrence185 to a review of the relevant historical authorities that support
his view, Justice Stevens also touched on historical support in his opinion for the majority. For example, "the judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or
sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law." 18 6 Further,
[w] here a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the offense, in order to bring the defendant within
that higher degree of punishment, must expressly charge it to have
179 Id. at 476.
180 Id. at 476-77.
181 Id. at 477 (quoting In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)) (emphasis added).
182 See id. ("[T]o guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers," trial by jury requIires that "the truth of every accusation ...be confirmed by
the unanimous suffrage of twelve... equals and neighbors." (citations and emphasis
omitted)).
183 Id. at 478 (citations omitted).
184 Id.
185 Justice Thomas's concurrence is discussed in detail infra notes 240-59 and accompanying text.
186 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 396 (1769)) (emphasis omitted).
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been committed under those circumstances, and must state the cir87
cumstances with certainty and precision.'
The Apprendi majority sawa "historic[al] link between verdict and
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal penalties."' 8 8 Further, this link highlights "the novelty of a legislative scheme that removes the jury from
the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." 18 9
Overall, the majority believed that "[t] he judge's role in sentencing is
constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment
and found by the jury. Put simply, facts that expose a defendant to a
punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by
definition 'elements' of a separate legal offense."' 9 °
The Apprendi majority next explained its holding in light of several landmark cases previously decided by the Court. Noting its holding in In re Winship,' 9 1 the Court stated that the "'reasonable doubt'
requirement 'has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent
reasons.'"192 Prosecution subjects a criminal defendant to "the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and.., the certainty
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." 193 Therefore, the
Court requires certain "procedural protections in order to 'provid[e]
concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,' and to reduce
94
the risk of imposing such deprivations erroneously."'
Justice Stevens added that since Winship, the Court made clear
that "Wi~hip's due process and associated jury protections extend, to
some degree, 'to determinations that [go] not to a defendant's guilt
or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence."'195 This was a
primary lesson of Mullaney v. Wibur,196 in which the Court held that
the government may not shift the burden of proof on elements of an
Id. at 480 (quoting 2 MATrHEw HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *170).
Id. at 482.
189 Id. at 482-83 (emphasis omitted).
190 Id. at 483 n.10.
191 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship is discussed fully supranotes 83-88 and accompanying text.
192 Apprend4 530 U.S. at 484 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
193 Id. (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
194 Id (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
195 Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 (1998)
187

188

(Scalia, J., dissenting)). Almendarez-Torres is discussed fully supra notes 118-27 and

accompanying text.
196 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Mullaney is discussed fully supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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offense. 197 In Mullaney, the government had posited that Winship protections did not apply in requiring a defendant to prove heat-of-passion intent to overcome a presumption of murderous intent because,
upon conviction of either offense, the defendant would face the same
loss of liberty and social stigma.1 98 Since the "consequences" of a
guilty verdict for murder and for manslaughter differed substantially,
the Court "dismissed the possibility that a State could circumvent the
protections of Winship merely by 'redefin [ing] the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely
on the extent of punishment."' 199
At this point in the opinion, the Apprendi majority discounted Jus20 1
tice O'Connor's suggestion in dissent 2 0 that Patterson v. New York
20
2
posed no direct challenge to this aspect of Mullaney.
Patterson held
that the government is allowed to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant on an affirmative defense. 20 3 According to the Apprendi
majority, "Patterson made clear that the state law still required the
State to prove every element of that State's offense of murder and its
accompanying punishment. 'No further facts are either presumed or
inferred in order to constitute the crime."' 204 In discounting the argument that the Court's Pattersonview could allow "state legislatures
to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at
least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes," the
Court added in Patterson that there were "obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard." 205
Justice Stevens next pointed out that it was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania2 0 6 in which the Court for the first time coined the term "sentencing factor" to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury but that
could affect the sentence imposed by ajudge. 20 7 McMillan held that a
court may use the preponderance of evidence standard when consid197

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.

198

See id. at 484-85 (citing Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-98).

199

Id. at 485 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698).

200 Id. at 530-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent begins on
530 U.S. at 523.
201 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Patterson is discussed fully supranotes 96-101 and accompanying text.
202

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 n.12.

203

See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206-09.

204

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 n.12 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-06).

205

Id. (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210).

206

477 U.S. 79 (1986). McMillan is discussed fully supra notes 102-17 and accom-

panying text.
207

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
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ering a sentencing factor. 20 8 According to the Apprendi majority, the
McMillan Court did not budge from the Winship position that there
are cohstitutional limits to states' authority to define away facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense.2 09 Further, a state scheme to
keep from juries facts that "expos[e] [defendants] to greater or addi2 10
tional punishment" may raise serious constitutional concerns.
Rather, the section of the Pennsylvania code 21n at issue in McMillan
"neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor
creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates
solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty
within the range already available to it without the [sentencing factor] ."212 The Pennsylvania statute gave "no impression of having been
tailored to permit the [sentencing factor] to be a tail which wags the
213
dog of the substantive offense."
The Apprendi majority next addressed the contention of Justice
O'Connor in her dissent that the Apprendi decision overrules McMillan. Justice Stevens wrote, "We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its
holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more
severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the
jury's verdict-a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion
itself."2 1 4
Justice Stevens concluded his review of pertinent prior case law by
stating that, as the Court
1
made plain in Jones last Term, Almendarez-Torres v. United Stats215

represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described....
...Almendarez-Torres turned heavily upon the fact that the additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was "the prior
commission of a serious crime." Both the certainty that procedural
safeguards attach to any "fact" of prior conviction, and the reality
that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that
"fact" in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment
concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a

208

See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-93.

209
210

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486.
Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).

211 42
212
213
214
215

PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 9712 (1982).

Apprnd4 530 U.S. at 486 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88).
Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88).
Id. at 487 n.13.
523 U.S. 224 (1998).

1236

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

77:4

"fact" increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory
range.

2 16

In conclusion, the Court found that its reexamination of cases in
this area and of the history upon which it relied confirmed the opinion expressed in Jones that "[o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."21 7 Further, "it is unconstitutional for a legislature
to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.
It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond
218
a reasonable doubt."
Having laid the foundation for its course of action, the Court
next turned its attention to the specific facts of the Apprendi case. Ap219
prendi asked the Court to invalidate a New Jersey statutory scheme

that
allows a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense
based on its finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully
possessed a prohibited weapon; after a subsequent and separate
proceeding, it then allows a judge to impose punishment identical
to that New Jersey provides for crimes of the first degree[2 2°1 based
upon the judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant's "purpose" for unlawfully possessing the weapon was
"to intimidate" his victim on the basis of a particular characteristic
221
the victim possessed.
The Court held that, "[i]n light of the constitutional rule explained above, and all of the cases supporting it, this practice cannot
stand."2 22 The State of New Jersey defended its hate crime enhancement statute with, inter alia, the claim that the "required finding of
biased purpose was not an 'element' of a distinct hate crime offense,
but rather the traditional 'sentencing factor' of motive." 223 This claim
216 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting in part Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at
230) (citations omitted).
217 Id. at 490.
218 Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
219 The applicable New Jersey statutes, including the "hate crime enhancement
statute," are reproduced in the Appendix to this work. Additionally, these provisions
are discussed supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
220 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a) (1) (West 1999).
221 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491.
222 Id. at 491-92.
223 Id. at 492.
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was summarily dismissed by the Court as "nothing more than a disa2 24
greement with the rule we apply today."
Further, the Court believed that any distinction between "sentencing factors" and "elements" was constitutionally novel and elusive, and was based on mere "labels." 225 Justice Stevens wrote,
"[d] espite what appears to us the clear 'elemental' nature of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does
the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 226 The footnote to
this sentence in the case accurately sums up the majority's position:
This is not to suggest that the term "sentencing factor" is devoid of
meaning. The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which
may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a
specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding
that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. On the other
hand, when the term "sentence enhancement" is used to describe
an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it
is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than
the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely
227
within the usual definition of an "element" of the offense.
In fact, "merely because the state legislature placed its hate crime
sentence 'enhancer' 'within the sentencing provisions' of the criminal
code 'does not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense." 228 The Court felt
that the effect of New Jersey's sentence "enhancement" unquestionably turned a second degree offense into a first degree offense and that
this conflicted directly with the warning in Mullaney that Winship is
concerned as much with the category of substantive offense as with
the "degree of criminal culpability" assessed. 2 29 A basic policy reason
for this is that "[t]he degree of criminal culpability the legislature
chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has significant implications both for a defendant's very liberty, and for the
heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature has se20
lected as worthy of greater punishment."

224

Id.

225

Id. at 494.

226

Id.

227
228
229
230

Id. at 494 n.19.
Id. at 495 (quoting New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (NJ. 1999)).
Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 495.
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The Court also said that New Jersey's reliance on McMillan in
23 1
order to justify its sentence enhancement statute was misplaced.
New Jersey had argued that any increase in Apprendi's sentence as a
result of the sentence enhancement was minimal. 23 2 In response, the
Court noted that "it can hardly be said that the potential doubling of
one's sentence-from 10 years to 20-has no more than a nominal
effect. Both in terms of absolute years behind bars, and because of
the more severe stigma attached, the differential here is unquestionably of constitutional significance. '233 At this point, Justice Stevens
proclaimed, "When ajudge's finding based on a mere preponderance
of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment,
it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense.'"234

Near the end of the majority's opinion, the Court noted that New
Jersey's reliance on Almendarez-Torres was also unavailing. 235 Almendarez-Torres dealt with recidivism, which "does not relate to the
commission of the offense" itself.2 3 6 Nevertheless, "New Jersey's bi-

ased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the commission of the offense. '2 37 The Court also noted the
vast difference between accepting the validity of a priorjudgment of
conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the
right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the
23 s
required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
In conclusion, the Apprendi majority held that the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that other than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
239
reasonable doubt.

231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

See
See
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

id.
id.
(quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
id. at 496.
(quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230, 244).
(quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230, 244).
id. at 476.
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2. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion 240
As noted above, 24 1 Justice Thomas accurately wrote that "[t]his
case turns
on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes a
'crime." 24 2 Indeed, all of the constitutional protections243 that citizens of this country enjoy turn on determining which facts constitute
the "crime"-in other words, which facts are the "elements" of the
crime. 244 It is thus critical to know which facts are elements.24 5 While
judges have long had to consider which facts are elements, this issue
"became more complicated following the Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvaniawhich spawned a special sort of fact known as a
sentencing enhancement. Such a fact increases a defendant's punishment but is not subject to the constitutional protections to which ele2 46
ments are subject."
Justice O'Connor's dissent2 47 agreed with McMillan and Almendarez-Torresin stating that "a legislature is free (within unspecified
outer limits) to decree which facts are elements and which are sentencing enhancements." 248 Justice Thomas took exception to this, believing that courts have long had to consider which facts are
elements. 249 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Thomas reviewed
"[a] long line of essentially uniform authority addressing accusations... stretching from the earliest reported cases after the founding
until well into the 20th century ... ,"250 Such authority established
"the original understanding of which facts are elements... [and demonstrates] that a 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis for
240 Justice Thomas was joined in his concurring opinion as to Parts I and II by
Justice Scalia. Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
241 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
242 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243 Justice Thomas summarizes that an accused person
has the right (1) "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" . . . (2) to be "held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime" only on an indictment or presentment of a grand jury, and (3) to be
tried by "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."
Id. (Thomas, J., coricurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. V,VI; citing U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 3).
244 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
245 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
247 Justice O'Connor's dissent is discussed fully infra notes 260-93 and accompa-

nying text.
248
249
250

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 500-01 (Thomas, I.,concurring).
Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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imposing or increasing punishment. ' 25 1 Therefore, if a legislature defines a certain core crime and then provides for increasing the punishment for that crime based on a finding of some aggravating fact of any
kind, including a prior conviction, the core crime and the aggravating
fact together constitute an aggravating crime. 25 2 For example, grand
larceny is an aggravated form of petty larceny. 253 According to Justice
Thomas, "the aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated crime,"
and "[n] o multifactor parsing of statutes, of the sort that we have attempted since McMillan, is necessary." 254 In sum, "[o]ne need only
look to the kind, degree, or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set of facts. Each fact necessary for
'25 5
that entitlement is an element.
Justice Thomas next embarked on an extremely detailed and
thorough historical review of cases and secondary sources dating back
to the 1840s, all of which he used to support his contention that
American courts readily applied to "new laws the common-law understanding that a fact that is by law the basis for imposing or increasing
punishment is an element."25 6 Conversely, if "a fact was not the basis
25 7
for punishment, that fact was, for that reason, not an element."
As he neared his conclusion, Justice Thomas wrote that "one of
the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres-an error to which I succumbed-was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an
offender's sentence. '258 Nevertheless,
251 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
252 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
253 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
254 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
255 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
256 Id. at 502 (Thomas, J., concurring). Highlights of this overview include the
following: a case involving burglary, in which the court stated that if "certain acts
are.., made punishable with greater severity, when accompanied with aggravating
circumstances [then the statute has created] two grades of crime," id. at 503-04
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lamed v. Commonwealth, 53 Mass. 240, 242
(1847)), and early cases addressing recidivism statutes, see id. at 506-07 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Welsh, 3 Va. 135, 135 (2 Va. Cas. 57, 57-59)
(1817)). Justice Thomas also heavily relies on an 1872 treatise by Joel Bishop, a leading authority in that era in the fields of criminal law and procedure. See id. at 510-21
(Thomas, J., concurring). For example, Bishop believed, "[t] he indictment must allege whatever is in law essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted." Id. at 510
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 1 JOEL BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50
(2d ed. 1872)).
257 Id. at 504 (Thomas, J., concurring).
258 Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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[w]hat matters is the way by which a fact enters into the sentence. If
a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment...
it is an element.... I am aware of no historical basis for treating as
259
a nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases punishment.
3.

2 60
The Principle Dissenting Opinion

Justice O'Connor's dissent may be outlined as follows: "Our
Court has long recognized that not every fact that bears on a defendant's punishment need be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proved by a reasonable doubt. Rather, we have held that the
'legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive."' 26 1 In arriving at this conclusion, she first dismissed the historical arguments advanced by the majority andJustice Thomas, and then
explained why that position is unworkable and unrealistic.
To begin, Justice O'Connor noted that "[n]o Member of [the]
Court questions the proposition that a state must charge in the indictment and prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt the actual elements of the offense. '26 2 "This case, however, concerns the distinct
question of when a fact that bears on a defendant's punishment, but
which the legislature has not classified as an element of the charged
offense, must nevertheless be treated as an offense element. ' 263 The
majority of the Apprendi Court held that its constitutional rule
"emerges from our history and case law." 264 Justice O'Connor, however, believed that "the history on which the Court's opinion relies
provides no support for its 'increase in the maximum penalty'
rule." 265 Indeed, "[t] he history cited by Justice Thomas does not re-

quire, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the application of the
259 Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring).
260 Justice O'Connor authored the principle dissent. She was joined in her
dissenting opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Id. at
523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 524 (5-4 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)); see alsoAlmendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 228 (1998); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 211, n.12 (emphasis
added).
262 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 527 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
263 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
264 Id. at 492.
265 Id. at 526 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
An examination of the decisions cited by Justice Thomas makes clear
that they did not involve a simple application of a long-settled common-law
rule that any fact that increases punishment must constitute an offense element. That would have been unlikely, for there does not appear to have
been any such common-law rule....
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rule he advocates. ' 266 Justice O'Connor dismissed as irrelevant the
historical arguments relied upon by the majority and Justice Thomas,
noting that "[w]hile the decisions Justice Thomas cites provide some
authority for the rule he advocates, they certainly do not control our
resolution of the federal constitutional question presented in [Apprendi] and cannot, standing alone, justify overruling three decades
26 7
worth of decisions by this Court."
Justice O'Connor next discounted the logic and analysis of the
majority's assertion that its rule is supported by "our cases in this
area." 268 The Court cited Mullaney v. Wilbur 26 9 "to demonstrate the
'lesson' that due process and jury protections extend beyond those
factual determinations that affect a defendant's guilt or innocence." 2 70 The Apprendi majority "explains Mullaney as having held
that the due process proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement
applies to those factual determinations that ...make a difference in
the degree of punishment the defendant receives."27 1 Nevertheless, this reasoning ignored the decision of the Court only two years later in Patterson v. New York.2 72 There the Court declined
to adopt as a constitutional imperative... that a State must disprove

beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic
procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the legis273
lative branch.
The Mullaney decision was explained further in Pattersonas holding only "that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof
to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the
other elements of the offense." 274 Indeed, "Pattersonis important be...Few of the decisions cited by Justice Thomas indicate a reliance on
pre-existing common-law principles.
Id. at 528-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 527 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis'omitted).
268 Id. at 490.

269 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
270 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 484).
271 Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referencing id. at 484) (emphasis
added).
272 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
273 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210) (emphases
added).
274 Id. at 532 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215).
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cause it plainly refutes the [majority's] expansive reading of
275
Mullaney."
The Apprendi majority also looked for support to the Court's decision in McMillan apparently to argue that any fact that changes in any
way the range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed must be
proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt. 276 Justice O'Connor believed that the Court's reliance in this regard was inaccurate. She
pointed out that the Court in Patterson and McMillan rejected the
claim that when a state links the severity of punishment to the presence or absence of an identified fact, the state must prove that fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. 277 The McMillan Court also reaffirmed
the Pattersonrule that "in determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive" 278 within certain undefined
constitutional limits. Additionally, the New Jersey statute at issue in
Apprendi resembles the Pennsylvania statute the Court upheld in McMillan in every respect but one. That difference was merely that the
New Jersey statute increases the maximum punishment to which a defendant may be exposed. In sum regarding McMillan, Justice
O'Connor believed that it holds the following:
When a State takes a fact that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment, and dictates the precise
weight that a court should give that fact in setting a defendant's
sentence, the relevant fact need not be proved to a jury beyond a
2 79
reasonable doubt as would an element of the offense.
The NewJersey statute also resembles the statute2 80 upheld in Almendarez-Torres v. United States28 1 in virtually every respect. 282 The only
significant difference was that the New Jersey statute provides an enhancement based on the defendant's motive, while the statute in Almendarez-Torres provided an enhancement based on the defendant's
commission of a prior felony.28 3 Since both factors are traditional bases for increasing an offender's seritence and may therefore serve as
275 Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276 See id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
277 See id. at 533-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84;
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
278 Id. at 534 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85).
279 Id. at 535 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90).
280 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994).
281 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Almendarez-Torres is discussed fully supra notes 118-27
and accompanying text.
282 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
283 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

1244

NOTRE

DAME LAW

[VOL- 77:4

REVIEW

the grounds for a sentence enhancement, the distinctions between
28 4
the two are of no constitutional importance.
Justice O'Connor found that while Mullaney and McMillan do not
lend support for the Apprendi majority's ruling, a case ignored by the
majority actually refuted the Court's holding.2

85

In

Walton v. Ari-

28 7
zona, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
On appeal, Walton challenged the Arizona capital sentencing scheme
that allowed ajudge, rather than ajury, to determine the existence of
any aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding between imposition of life imprisonment or capital punishment.2 8 8 Such a contention was renounced soundly by the Walton Court, 289 leaving the
Apprendi dissenters to wonder:
If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that
makes the difference between life and death, as Walton holds that it
can, it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same with respect
to a factual determination that results in only a 10-year increase in
290
the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.
286

The dissenters concluded by summarizing that the majority's
"statement that its 'increase in the maximum penalty' rule emerges
from the history and case law that it cites is simply incorrect." 29 1 The
Court cited irrelevant historical evidence, ignored controlling precedent (e.g., Patterson), and failed to distinguish between its Apprendi
decision and previous cases addressing the same subject in the context
284 See id. (O'Connor,'J., dissenting).
285 See id. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
286 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
287 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to Walton, 497
U.S. at 642).
288 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289 See id. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 647). Indeed, as of January 14, 2002 there was a growing list of Apprendi-related grants of
certiori to the Supreme Court for that term, including Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 865
(2002), wherein the Justices will reconsider a statement in Apprendi that preserves
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme. In Ring, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that
the Apprendi majority had expressly preserved Walton, which approved Arizona's
judge-sentencing scheme. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151-52 (Ariz. 2001). The
Arizona Supreme Court explained thatJustice O'Connor's Apprendi dissent correctly
described Arizona's system as one of factfinding by judge rather than by jury, but the
court found itself bound by the Apprendi majority's apparent desire to carve out Walton. Id. at 1152. Additional Apprendi-related grants include Harrisv. United States, 122
S. Ct. 663 (20(11), and United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 803 (2002), in which the Court
will decide whether it can accept the ramifications of Apprendi's reasoning.
290 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of capital sentencing (e.g., Walton).292 Overall, according to the dissenters, the majority's newly minted legal doctrine in Apprendi is not
29 3
required by the Constitution.
III.
A.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

PossibleInterpretationsof the Court's Decision

In the wake of Apprendi's "newly-elaborated constitutional mandate," 294 state and federal district trial judges are without guidance as
to exactly what the controlling rule of the Court is. At least two possible interpretations may be offered of the constitutional principle
upon which the Apprendimajority's decision rests. 295 Under one reading, the Court appears to hold that the Constitution requires that a
fact be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt
only if that fact extends the range of punishment beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum 2 9 6 Yet, reacting to such an interpretation, a state's
legislature could easily remove from the jury (and thereby subject to a
standard of proof below "beyond a reasonable doubt") the assessment
of those facts that fall within the statutory range, to which the defendant may be sentenced.2 97 Indeed, New Jersey could "cure" its sentencing scheme and achieve the same results by redrafting its weapons
possession statute in the following manner: the legislature first could
provide in the statute itself for a range of five to twenty years of imprisonment for any person who commits the offense. 298 Next, NewJersey
could arrange the statute so that only those defendants convicted
under this law who are found by a judge, by a preponderance of the
evidence, to have acted with a purpose to intimidate a person on the
basis of race may receive a sentence of greater than ten years imprisonment. 299 The Apprendi majority opinion does not foreclose such
manipulation; within certain limitations, in fact, it practically invites
292 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
293 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
294 United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2001).
295 See Apprend4 530 U.S. at 540 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor here points to an example
of this possible interpretation, directing the reader to Justice Stevens's statement that,
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
297 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
298 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, "[i] t is difficult to understand, and the Court does not
explain, why the Constitution would require a state legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic difference in drafting its crimi01
nal statutes."
Under a separate reading, the Court's decision could be read to
mean that it is only constitutionally required "that a fact be submitted
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt if it, as a formal matter, increases the range of punishment beyond that which could legally be
imposed absent thatfact.''302 Reacting to such an interpretation, a state's
legislature could act in a manner that is almost the mirror image of
the first interpretation and easily remove from the jury (and thereby
subject to a standard of proof below "beyond a reasonable doubt") the
assessment of those facts that decrease the range of punishment below
that which legally could be imposed absent that fact.30 3 Again, New

Jersey could comply with Patterson and "cure" its sentencing scheme,
thereby achieving the same intended results by redrafting its weapons
possession statute in the following manner: the legislature could first
provide in the statute itself for a range of five to twenty years of imprisonment for any person who commits the offense. 0 4 Next, NewJersey
could arrange the statute so that only those defendants convicted
under this law who ajudge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
to not have acted with a purpose to intimidate a person on the basis of
race may receive a sentence of no greater than ten years imprisonment.30 5 Overall, the specific means by which a legislature chooses to
300 In discussing the difference between the terms "sentencing factor" and "sentence enhancement," Justice Stevens writes that the term "sentencing factor"
appropriately describes a circumstance... that supports a specific sentence
within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of

a particular offense. On the other hand, when the term "sentence enhancement" is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory

sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense
than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely
within the usual definition of an "element" of the offense.
Id. at 494 n.19 (second emphasis added).
It is not difficult to imagine a legislature altering its sentencing scheme in order
to get around the Apprendi Court's distinctions between monikers such as "sentencing
factors" and "sentence enhancements" in order to legitimize the state's goals regarding the handling and punishment of certain crimes.
301 Id. at 541 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
302 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
303 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
304 See id. at 541-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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control judges' discretion within that permissible range is of no
30 6
importance.
As recently as May 2001, the published results of a comprehensive
examination showed that legislatures will, in fact, engage in post-Apprendi evasion.30 7 Indeed, by "[s]uggesting that efforts to avoid the
consequences of the rule in Apprendi by redrafting criminal statutes
will be subject to 'constitutional scrutiny,' the Court has invited litigation over the constitutionality of substantive criminal law. Not surprisingly, it has offered few clues about the shape of that constitutional
308
scrutiny."
Justice O'Connor correctly points out that "whether a fact is responsible for an increase or a decrease in punishment rests in the eye
of the beholder."3 0 9 Nevertheless, given the fact that the two possible
interpretations presented above rest on the mere formalistic interpretation of the Court's words, it is more likely that the constitutional
principle underlying the Apprendi holding is further reaching.3 1 0 The
dissent believes that the actual principle "may be that any fact (other
than prior conviction) that has the effect, in real terms, of increasing
the maximum punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."'3 11 To put it differently, in Justice Stevens's words, "does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"3 12 This principle is extremely far reaching, for it not only encompasses a system like New
Jersey's where a factual determination could expose a defendant to a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum, but also to any and all deter3 13
minate-sentencing schemes like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in which the length of a defendant's sentence within the statutory
range turns on specific factual determinations. 31 4 Such a principle
306
307
1467
308
309

See id. at 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, EssentialElements, 54 VAND. L. Rav. 1467,
(2001).
Id. at 1469.
Apprend4 530 U.S. at 542-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

310 See id. at 543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 494).
313 A detailed discussion of the origination and benefits of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines is provided supra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.

314

See Apprend4 530 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed, "Justice

Thomas essentially concedes that the rule outlined in his concurring opinion would
require the invalidation of the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. (citing id. at 523 n.11
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
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basically invalidates decisions such as Pattersonand Walton, yet the Ap3 15
prendi majority formally declined to do so.

B.

3 16
ConstitutionalRamifications

In light of the Court's significant history of approving discretionary sentencing by judges, "it is difficult to understand how the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments could possibly require the
Court's or Justice Thomas's rule."3 17 The dissenters noted that it is

indeed "remarkable that the Court cannot identify a single instance, in
the over 200 years since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that our
Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces today."3 18 As the majority acknowledged, the Supreme Court
has never doubted the constitutionality of permitting Congress and
the state legislatures to define criminal offenses, to delineate broad
ranges of punishment for those offenses, and to give judges discretion
to decide where specifically within those ranges each particular defendant's punishment should be set.3 1 9 The Court stated,

We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have
often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the
3 20
individual case.
Consequently, any due process concerns are simply not implicated
under legitimate use of discretionary sentencing.
Under a discretionary-sentencing scheme, 3 2' judges base the
sentences of defendants on numerous facts neither presented at trial
315 See id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
316 In succinctly describing the issue of Apprendi,Justice Stevens wrote that "[t]he
question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by ajury on the basis of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added). However,
as Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns are incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, see, e.g., id. at 532-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), they are therefore
correspondingly addressed throughout the Apprendi case and this Comment.
317 Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations inserted).
318 Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
319 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referencing id. at 480-81).
320 Id. at 481.
321 In a "discretionary-sentencing scheme," as the title suggests, "the judge's decision of where to set the defendant's sentence within the prescribed statutory range is
left almost entirely to discretion." Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In a "deter-

2002]

2 WHO DECIDES WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRIME?"

1249

nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.32 2 Indeed, a factual

determination made by a judge using a standard of proof below "beyond a reasonable doubt" often made the difference between a lesser
and a greater punishment. 323 The Court's precedent in Williams
holds that ajudge may leave the determination of a defendant's sentence to ajudge's discretionary decision within a prescribed range of
penalties. 324 When a judge accordingly decides to increase a defendant's sentence on the basis of certain contested facts, it is not neces3 25
sary that those facts be proven to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rather, the judge's findings, whether determined by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or less, are constitutionally sufficient. 326 Yet, the Apprendi decision seems to indicate that if a legislature prescribes certain
sentences to be imposed in connection with the determination of
those same facts, the Constitution requires that those facts instead be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.3

27

This directly conflicts

with the Court's holding in McMillan that "[w]e have some difficulty
fathoming why the due process calculus would change simply because
the legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with addiminate-sentencing system," however, "the discretion the judge wields within the statutory range is tightly constrained." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see aso supra notes
37-46 and accompanying text (discussion of "Sentencing in General").
322 See Apprend4 530 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
323 See id, (O'Connor, J.; dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited the following example to illustrate her point:
[I]n Williams v. New York [337 U.S. 241 (1949)], ajlry found the defendant
guilty of first-degree murder and recommended life imprisonment. The
judge, however, rejected the jury's recommendation and sentenced Williams
to death on the basis of additional facts that he learned through a pre-sentence investigation report and that had neither been charged in an indictment nor presented to the jury. In rejecting Williams's due process
challenge to his death sentence, we explained that there was a long history
of sentencing judges exercising "wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used to assist [them] in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by the law." Specifically, we held that
the Constitution does not restrict ajudge's sentencing decision to information that is charged in an indictment and subject to cross-examination in
open court. "The due process clause should not be treated as a device for
freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure."
Id. at 545-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
324 See id. at 546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
327 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tional guidance. '3 28 While the Court acknowledges the legitimacy of
discretionary sentencing by judges, it never provides a valid reason for
treating differently under the Constitution the judicial fact finding involved in determinate-sentencing schemes now prevalent today. 329
Consideration in particular of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
guarantee further demonstrates why the Court's acceptance ofjudgemade findings under discretionary sentencing suggests approval of
the same judge-made findings in the context of determinate sentencing as well. 330 A compelling purpose of the Sixth Amendment's jury
trial guarantee is to protect criminal defendants against potentially arbitrary judges.3 3 1 It is certainly a logical conclusion that such Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantees, if they apply to sentencing at all,
would apply with greater strength to discretionary-sentencing schemes
rather than to determinate-sentencing schemes. 33 2 Discretionary-sentencing schemes allow an arbitrary judge much greater potential to
disproportionately sentence one defendant relative to a similarly situated defendant; under a system of determinate-sentencing, however,
the discretion available to ajudge is tightly constrained within the statutory range.3 3 3 It is therefore rational to conclude that since the
Court approves of discretionary-sentencing schemes, in which the defendant is not entitled to have ajury make factual findings relevant to
sentencing despite the effect those findings have on the severity of the
defendant's sentence, the defendant should have no right to have a
jury make the equivalent factual determinations under a determinatesentencing scheme.3 3 4 Consequently, none of the due process or fair
trial safeguards protected by the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments are impacted by allowing ajudge to increase a convicted defendant's punishment based on a factual determination considered by a
standard of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
328

Id. at 546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477

U.S. 79, 92 (1986)).
329 See id. at 547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas's attempt to explain
this distinction is equally unavailing. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed,
[a] defendant's actual punishment can be affected in a very real way by facts
never alleged in an indictment, never presented to ajury, and never proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Williams' case, facts presented for the first
time to the judge, for purposes of sentencing alone, made the difference
between life imprisonment and a death sentence.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
330 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
331 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332 See id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
333 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
334 See id. at 548-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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PracticalRamifications:Is Apprendi the Death Knell for DeterminateSentencing Schemes?
Overview and Analysis of the Realistic Problems and
Unanswered Questions Created by Apprendi

The Apprendi majority held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments command that, other than the fact of a prior conviction,
increases in the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3 3 5 In other words, every fact that is relevant to the determination of sentence under a determinate-sentencing scheme must be
submitted to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt If this is
an accurate description of the constitutional principle underlying Apprendi, then this decision will have the effect of invalidating significant
sentencing reforms enacted at the federal and state levels over the
336
past three decades.
Prior to the most recent wave of sentencing reform, the federal
and state governments "employed indeterminate-sentencing schemes
in which judges and executive branch officials (e.g., parole board officials) had substantial discretion to determine the actual length of a
defendant's sentence. 3 37 Yet, studies of such indeterminate-sentencing schemes found that similarly situated defendants often received
widely disparate sentences. 33 8 Responding to this problem, Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.3 39 In spite of limited criticism that the Guidelines are incomplete and occasionally require
judges to depart from them,3 40 these Guidelines have committed the
341
federal system to rationality and consistency in criminal sentencing.
Yet Apprendi appears excessively broad in its holding and, possibly, to be a violation of the separation of powers between the three
branches of our federal government. The holding is excessively
broad, for the apparent effect of the Court's holding is to halt any
debate on sentencing reform "and to invalidate with the stroke of a
335 See id. at 476.
336 See id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Thomas seems to have
indicated that the Sentencing Guidelines may be invalidated under Apprend See id.
at 523 n.ll (Thomas, J., concurring).
337 Id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
338 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
339 See id. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
340 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
341 See DISSENTING VIEW, supranote 45, at 2; see also supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
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pen three decades' worth of nationwide reform, all in the name of a
principle with a questionable constitutional pedigree."3 42 The Apprendi dissenters accurately sum up this additional resultant effect of
the majority's holding:
[I] t is ironic that the Court, in the name of constitutional rights
meant to protect criminal defendants from the potentially arbitrary
exercise of power by prosecutors and judges, appears to rest its decision on a principle that would render unconstitutional efforts by
Congress and the state legislatures to place constraints on that very
343
power in the sentencing context.

The Apprendi Court believes that no historical basis exists to suggest that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion in imposingjudgment within the range prescribed by statute. 344 The Apprendi
majority raised no objection to traditional, pre-Guidelines sentencing
procedures whereby judges, not juries, made the factual determinations that would lead to an increase in an individual offender's sentence.345 Yet Justice Breyer believes that the majority leaves
unanswered the question of how a legislative determination of those
facts would be different in any significant way. 34 6 The Court's theory
apparently supports the following proposition: if a legislature attempts
to limit the discretion of ajudge, that makes any subsequent sentencing unconstitutional. By contrast, if a judge has total discretion, the
Court would approve and hold that there is no requirement that a
fact, whether a "sentencing factor" or a true "element" of the crime,
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While the Apprendi Court
found no exisiting history to support "sentencing factors," no history
is present saying there should not be any. 347 If no history or constitutional text gives the Court an answer as to what specifically should be
an "element" and what should be a "sentencing factor," then the
Court should defer this issue to the legislature. 348 If we allow our system to revert to judges having complete discretion, we may well return
to a sentencing structure that is neither fair nor honest regarding all
3 49
defendants.
The strongest and most critical impact of Apprendi "will be a practical one-its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under cur342
343
344

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 481 (emphasis added).

345 See id. at 561 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
346 See id. at 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
347 See discussion supra note 320 and accompanying text.
348

349

See discussion supra notes 248, 261 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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rent federal and state determinate-sentencing schemes."3 50 While at
least the Fourth Circuit 35 1 and Eleventh Circuit35 2 have specifically
stated that Apprendi does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines, Justice O'Connor points out that "the Court does not say whether these
schemes are constitutional, but its reasoning strongly suggests that
they are not.135 3 Further, Justice Breyer's dissent 354 points out that
the Apprendi holding
would seem to promote a procedural ideal-that of juries, not
judges, determining the existence of those facts upon Which increased punishment turns. But the real world of criminal justice
cannot hope to meet any such ideal. It can function only with the
help of procedural compromises, particularly in respect to sentencing. And those compromises, which are themselves necessary for
the fair functioning of the criminal justice system, preclude implementation of the procedural model that today's decision reflects.
At the very least, the impractical nature of the [majority's holding]
supports the proposition that the Constitution was not intended to
55

embody it.3

350 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
351 See United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2000). See id. at
199-202 for a thoughtful discussion by Judge Niemeyer about the definition of "prescribed statutory maximum" under Apprendi
352 See United States v. Harris, 244 F.3d 828, 830 (11th Cir. 2001). The Harris
court noted that "[b] ecause a finding under the Sentencing Guidelines determines
the sentence within the statutory range rather than outside it, the decision in Apprend, which addresses any increase in penalty for a crime outside the statutory maximum, has no application to the Guidelines." Id. (quoting United States v.
Maldenaldo Sanchez, 242 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001)). Indeed, "[i]twill always
be the case that the sentencing range identified by the Guidelines will not exceed the
statutory maximum, as the Sentencing Guidelines require that the Guidelines cannot
be used to increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum." Id. at 830 n.3 (citing
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5Gll (1988)).

353 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550-52 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting). The question begs:
If the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not unconstitutional to create, as was held
in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989), then why does the Apprendi
Court find them unconstitutional to administer? However, the point may be moot, as
Justice Thomas seems to have indicated that the Sentencing Guidelines may be invalidated under Apprendi See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.1l (Thomas, J., concurring).
354 Justice Breyer was joined in his dissenting opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist.
Append, 530 U.S. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
355 Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Expanding on this idea of

"compromises," one may take the question of what Apprendi means for the future of

criminal justice to its next logical step and determine that Apprendi may be more
appropriately referred to as "Mullaney v. Wilbur IL" Recall that the Court sustained
Pattersonas a compromise: "While it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to
bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the
risk it must bear is not without limits .... " Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208
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In light of this, it will certainly be interesting to watch the Supreme Court's reaction to the cases that hold the Guidelines in general are unaffected by Apprendi.
Indeed, the practical reason why judges, rather than juries, traditionally determined the presence or absence of sentencing factors in
any given case is crucial.3 56 It does not reflect an idea of procedural
fairness, but rather an administrative need for procedural compromise. 357 To put it frankly and simply, far too many potentially relevant

sentencing factors are present in real life to permit submission of
many or all of them to ajury. 358 To ask ajury, consisting of numerous
men and women of varying backgrounds, experience, and education,
to consider many or all of such factors is unworkable. 359
Further, requiring a jury to consider all such factors during a
trial, where the issue is guilt or innocence, could place the defendant
(1977). Indeed, the Constitution contains no definition of an offense. In fact, the
Supreme Court has determined that the meaning of an "offense" is statutory. The
Constitution is not a theory, but rather a series of compromises. It is therefore a non
sequitur that the Court allows affirmative defenses to be determined by the legislature
(since the Constitution never spells out what is an "element" of an offense) but does
not allow the legislature to determine what constitutes the elements of an offense. In
effect, Apprendi shifts to defendants the burden of disproving the surrounding circumstances and conduct that had previously been determined by a judge to be sentencing factors. Apprendi is a decision without real life compromises.
356 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
357 See id. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358 See id. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting). An example of a typical case might be
[a] bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept hidden (or
brandished), might have frightened (or merely warned), injured seriously
(or less seriously), tied up (or simply pushed) a guard, a teller, or a customer, at night (or at noon), for a bad (or arguably less bad) motive, in an
effort to obtain money for other crimes (or for other purposes), in the company of a few (or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) time that day,
while sober (or under the influence of drugs or alcohol), and so forth.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES pt. A, 1.2).
359 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In discussing the distinctions between presenting to juries facts that establish the criminality of a defendant's conduct and those
that merely satisfy procedural requirements (such as venue and jurisdiction), the authors of the MPC lend support to this belief, writing that "there is grave danger of
confusion in presenting to ajury different standards for appraising different features
of the prosecution's case." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 cmt.-proof beyond a reasonable doubt 189 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1962). For a thorough discussion
of cases and studies on whether requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather
than proof by preponderance of the evidence affects the outcome of a trial, see Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal

Cases, 86

YALE

L.J. 1299, 1308-11 (1977); see also MODEL

proof beyond a reasonable doubt 190 n.6.

PENAL CODE

§ 1.12 cmL-
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in the awkward and unfair position of having to deny he committed
the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it.3 6 ° An example
3
might be, "I did not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams."

61

Another example involves juvenile convictions, Which the Ninth Circuit found do not fall under the Apprendi exception in AlmendarezTorres.3 62 Indeed,

a defendant with a prior juvenile adjudication will be put to the
Hobson's choice of stipulating to the priors or pariading them
before ajury. But, as Almendarez-Torres recognized, "[e]ven if a de-

fendant's stipulation were to keep the name and details of the previous offense from the jury, jurors would 'still learn, from the
indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor, that the defendant had
committed [three violent felonies]." . . . This approach seems to

wreak havoc on the very due process rights Apprendi sought to

vindicate.

363

While special post-verdict sentencing juries could remedy this
problem, "they have seemed (but for capital cases) not worth their
administrative costs. ' 3 64 "In principle, the number of potentially relevant behavioral characteristics is endless," 365 and a judge is far better

suited to determine which factors should be taken into account for
3 66

sentencing purposes.
The Apprendi majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
360 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
361 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
362 See United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001).
363 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200-01 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998)).
364 Apprend4 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
366 See id. at 557. The drafters of the MPG appear to have given judges more
credit than most regarding the issue of ensuring fairness toward defendants under
different burdens of proof: The MPC indicates that when a fact to be considered is
not an element of the offense charged, "the fact must be proved to the satisfaction of
the Court or jury, as the case may be." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(4) (b). While
proof "to the satisfaction of the court or jury" leaves an ambiguity as to the required
measure of persuasion, it means at least proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 cmt.-burden of proof with respect to facts not an
"element" of an offense: subsection (4) 201 (Official Draft & Revised Comments
1962). Yet, the drafters of the MPC believe that proof by a preponderance of evidence "is not likely to leave room for a substantial doubt. This should suffice to afford adequate protection in an area where it was sought to broaden the discretion of
the court[s]." See id. at 201.
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doubt. The question therefore arises: Does Apprendi overrule McMillan?3 67 Justice Stevens wrote, "We do not overrule McMillan. We limit

its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence
more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established
by the jury's verdict ....
,,368 Yet, if ajudge does not sentence beyond
the statutory maximum, then a fact may be considered a sentencing
element. The question then becomes what will the Supreme Court
allow as an acceptable "statutory maximum"? Will the Court defend
this under the Eighth Amendment right to proportionality or the
right against cruel and unusual punishment? If so, then every sentencing scheme designed by a legislature raises an Eighth Amendment
question. Will the Court constitutionalize the length of punishment?
If so, then the five Justices in the Apprendi majority may find themselves policing the criminal codes in every state to ensure that the new
Apprendi mandate is not violated.369 It will be impossible for the Justices of the Supreme Court to review all of the criminal codes in this
country for legislative conformity with the vague Apprendi determination of what constitutes the "eements" of a crime (i.e., facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed). Such a determination of what the elements of
a crime are-and the rationale behind each one-is far better suited
for Congress and the fifty state legislAtures. Nevertheless, the Court
has dictated in Apprendi that a legislative body may not do so.
A related question that the Apprendi Court does not answer deals
with the effect of juror exposure to the supposed "elements" of a defendant's crime that were previously considered "sentencing elements." For example, in Jones v. United States,370 the Court considered
the pertinent car-jacking statute3 7 1 and determined that the "if death
results" and "if serious bodily injury results" clauses were elements of
the statute.3 72 Yet, under an Almendarez-Tores3 7 3 scenario, why should
recidivism not be made an element of the offense as opposed to a
sentencing factor? The drawback to this is, of course, that prosecutors
367 McMillan is discussed supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text. A related
question that remains unanswered by the Apprendi Court is whether "mandatory mini-

mum" sentencing schemes like the one in McMillan are also overruled.
368 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13 (emphasis added).
369 The Court found themselves in a similar predicament when they constitutionalized, for example, aspects of the admininstration of prisons and mental health facilities. See, e.g., Interview with G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School, in Notre Dame, Ind. (Nov. 10, 2000) (on file with author).
370 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
371 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
372 Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-52. In fact, this is probably a fair reading of that statute.
373 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
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could introduce at trial that the defendant was convicted of prior
crimes, thereby possibly "poisoning" the jury against the defendant for
the current crime with which the defendant is charged. To remove
what were traditionally guideline departure factors (i.e., sentencing
factors) from the purview of judges and give them instead to juries as
elements of offenses is, in fact, more detrimental in the end for defendants, because it exposes to the jury all of the negative aspects of a
defendant's conduct. The Apprendi decision will undoubtedly lead to
increased conviction rates byjuries.3 74 When Congress and state legislatures chose in their respective criminal codes to have a judge determine, as a sentencing factor, whether or not a defendant had any
prior convictions, this decision did not have a basis anywhere in history or the text of the Constitution-it was instituted as a pragmatic
matter for the protection of defendants.
Moreover, with respect to past sentences handed down by judges
under determinate-sentencing schemes, the Apprendi decision has unleashed "a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the authority of the
Court's decision." 3 75 Apprendi threatens to bog down state and federal
courts in procedural review of countless sentences.
2. Fallout: Several Examples of the Many Petitions for Sentence
Reversals
Almost 500,000 federal defendants have been sentenced under
the Sentencing Guidelines since 1989.376 Further, while exact figures

are unavailable, a multitude of federal prisoners were convicted of
drug crimes in which the quantity of drugs involved, as determined by
the judge, pushed their sentences over the statutory maximum. These
374 For example, in an aggravated assault statute, a defendant's guilt or innocence
could easily rest on whether possession of a gun is considered an "element" of the
offense or a "sentencing factor." If such posgession remains a sentencing factor, this
would have the effect of making it "grading," which should be construed under strict
liability. See supra notes 10-36 and accompanying text. Making possession of a gun
an "element" rather than a "sentencing factor," however, means that it becomes a
liability factor (i.e., right or wrong) rather than a grading element (i.e., strict). Jury
members hearing of yet another "wrong" thing that the defendant has done may lead
to an increased likelihood of conviction. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235.
375 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Recent cases documenting this very problem are discussed fully infra notes 376-420
and accompanying text.
376 See Apprend4 530 U.S. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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based on

Nevertheless, federal defendants make up only the tip of the sentencing iceberg. "In 1998, for example, federal criminal prosecutions
represented only about 0.4% of the total number of criminal prosecu377 Other criteria previously considered as sentencing factors may also become
'elements" in light of Apprendi. One example is "quantity of money laundered." See
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994). Apprendi could change the valuable sentencing tool of
"criminal forfeiture" (under 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) to an
"element" of the offense. In Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995), the'Court
specifically held that "[f]orfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following
conviction .... Congress conceived forfeiture as a punishment for the commission of
various drug and racketeering crimes." Libretti, 516 U.S. at 38-39. Additionally,
"[f]orfeiture is imposed 'in addition to any other sentence,'" and "Congress plainly
intended forfeiture of assets to operate as punishmentfor criminal conduct in violation
of the federal drug and racketeering laws, not as a separatesubstantive offense." Id. at 39
(citation omitted) (original emphasis deleted) (emphases added). Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,Breyer, and the ChiefJustice all
concurred in this portion of the holding, see id. at 31, for the Justices indicated in
italics were all in the Apprendi majority. Further, Justices Scalia and Thomas, both
Apprendi majority members, concurred with the following from Librettk
Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant does not enjoy a
constitutional right to ajury determination as to the appropriate sentence to
be imposed. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 47 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)
("[T] here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the
sentence turns on specific findings of fact.").
Id. at 49. While Libretti has not been overturned as of this writing, it appears that it
most certainly will be overruled in the near future under the Court-created Apprendi
law, for under that logic the Court will most likely see "forfeiture" as an increase in
punishment that could exceed the statutory maximum a defendant might otherwise
face. A recent Seventh Circuit case could serve as the vehicle for the Court's determination of the Apprendi-forfeiture issue. See United States v. Vera, 278 F.3d 672 (7th
Cir. 2002). Judge Easterbrook wrote in Vera:
Like the other circuits that have considered this question, we hold that Apprendi does not disturb the rule that forfeiture is constitutional when supported by the preponderance of the evidence....
Determining the forfeitable proceeds of an offense does not come
within. Apprendi's rule, because there is no "prescribed statutory maximum"
and no risk that the defendant has been convicted defacto of a more serious
offense. [21 U.S.C. §] 853(a) is open-ended; all property representing the
proceeds of drug offenses is forfeitable. Forfeiture has long been a civil remedy as well as a criminal sanction, handled by a preponderance standard in
either event-and usually by the judge rather than the jury. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32.2. Restitution, another open-ended component of both criminal
and civil judgments, is not affected by Apprendi because there is no "statutory
maximum." Forfeiture is governed by the same principle and thus may be
decided by the judge on a preponderance standard.
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ions in federal and state courts. Because many States, like NewJersey,
have determinate-sentencing schemes, the number of individual
378
sentences drawn into question by the Court's decision [is] colossal."
379
While thousands of Apprendi-related appeals are in the system,
four recent examples from the Fourth and Seventh Circuits are illus378 Vera, 278 F.3d 672-73 (citations omitted); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
379 The following cases are arranged numerically by circuit and illustrate how the
federal courts of appeals are each handling the many hundreds of Apprendi-related
appeals that come before them:
United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2001).
By its own terms, the holding in Apprendi applies only when the disputed
"fact" enlarges the applicable statutory maximum and the defendant's sentence exceeds the original maximum. For this reason, Apprendi simply does
not apply to guideline findings (including, inter alia, drug weight calculations) that increase the defendant's sentence, but do not elevate the sentence to a point beyond the lowest applicable statutory maximum.
Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing the
basic Apprendi holding that "any fact other than a prior conviction that increases a
defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise applicable maximum penalty must be decided by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt").
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a defendant has no valid Apprendi claim where his ultimate sentence is less than that which
would have been authorized by the jury's verdict); see also id. at 862 ("Apprendi does
not apply to... increases[s] ... under the Sentencing Guidelines.").
United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding no
error in the sentence the defendant received because it was less than the maximum
penalty authorized by the facts found by the jury). See further discussion of Angle
infra notes 380-88 and accompanying text.
United States v. Baptiste, 264 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
In this court, drug trafficking crimes defined in 21 U.S.C. § 841 are governed by Apprendi analysis on the theory that the dramatically tiered
sentences for increasing quantities of illegal drugs enhance the "core" statutory maximum of § 841(b) (1) (C). United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160,
163 (5th Cir. 2000). Consequently, the quantity of drugs must be alleged in
the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt if,
as here,
the government seeks enhanced penalties under §841(b)(1)(A) or
(b) (1) (B). [Doggett, 230 F.3d] at 164-65.
Baptiste 264 F.3d at 592.
United States v. Alvarez, 266 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
Apprendi explicitly applies only. to those situations in which "afactual determination made under a lesser standard of proof than the reasonable doubt
standard increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum."
... To put it another way, the Sixth Circuit has determined that "the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed, such as moving up the scale of mandatory
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minimum sentences, invokes the full range of constitutional protections required for 'elements of the crime.'" Therefore, "[a]ggravating factors, other
than a prior conviction, that increase the penalty from a nonmandatory minimum sentence to a mandatory minimum sentence, or from a lesser to a
greater minimum sentence, are now elements of the crime to be charged
and proved."
Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted).
United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001).
It is now clear that, if drug quantity is determined by the sentencing judge
rather than by the jury, a defendant's rights are violated when the sentence
dictated by the drug quantity is greater than the lowest, unenhanced statutory maximum prescribed by § 841(b). Thus, when drug quantity is not
charged in the indictment or submitted to the jury, the statutory maximum
under § 841 (b) must be determined without reference to drug quantity.
Id. at 632 (citation omitted).
United States v. Bradford, 246 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding it less
than clear as to whether the court of appeals "must avert Apprendiviolations by merely
finding that the district court could have imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences to justify those actually imposed, or whether [the court] may or
should remand on that point"); ef. United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518-19 (4th
Cir. 2001).
[T] he sentencing guidelines instruct that if the total punishment mandated
by the guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum of the most serious offense
of conviction, the district court must impose consecutive terms of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment....
...

Apprendi does not foreclose this result.

Id.
United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Juvenile adjtidications that do not afford the right to ajury trial and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof.., do not fall within Apprendi's 'prior conviction' exception.").
United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Other circuits
have held that Apprendi does not apply to sentencing factors that increase a defendant's guideline range but do not increase the statutory maximum. We agree with
those circuits.") (citations omitted).
United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to submit the
issue of drug quantity to the jury was held to be harmless error that did not require
reversal, since it was "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty absent the error") (citation omitted); accordUnited States
v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
[I]n drug cases charged under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, where the prescribed statutory maximum depends upon the amount of drugs involved,
before a defendant can be sentenced to a higher statutory maximum, "the
Government must state the drug type and quantity in the indictment, submit
the required evidence to the jury, and prove the relevant drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt."
... [But,] Apprendi does not apply to enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines when the resulting sentence remains within the statutory
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trative of the waves of convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their
sentences based on Apprendi and the problems these appeals are causing the courts and prosecutors.
First, United States v. Angle38 0 is a typical post-Apprendi case facing
district courts, due to the excessively large federal mandatory minimum sentences required by Congress for certain drug offenses. The
defendants in Angle challenged their convictions based on the proposition that the district court failed to treat as an element the specific
quantity of narcotics involved in. the offense. 38 1 A panel of the Fourth
Circuit initially handled this appeal and summarized the new case law
arising out of Apprendi:
Under Apprendi, sentencing factors that support a specific sentence
within the statutorily prescribed penalty range are still properly submitted to a judge to be found by a preponderance of the evidence.
...

Apprendi neither overrules McMillan nor makes the term "sen-

tencing factor" devoid of meaning. Ultimately, a court may still consider aggravating and mitigating factors that support a specific
sentence within the statutorily prescribed range When sentencing a
defendant, so long as the sentence imposed is not greater than the maxi-

38 2
mum statutory penalty... established by the jury's verdict.
Based on the case law established in Apprendi, the panel next resolved the issue of whether the drug quantity attributed to Angle at
sentencing was an element that should have been proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, or a sentencing factor that was properly
found by the district court judge by a preponderance of the evidence.3 83 In spite of the fact that the Fourth Circuit and "all of her
sister circuits have held that drug quantity is a sentencing factor, not

an element of the crime.... Apprendi does change the traditionalinterpretation that drug quantity is always a sentencingfactor." 3- 4 Therefore, if the

findings of particular drug quantities expose the defendants to
sentences greater than authorized by the jury's verdict under the relevant drug statute, then the requirement of Apprendi has not been satismaximum. This understanding of Apprendi is shared by our [thereinafter
listed] sister circuits.
Id. at 1043-44 (citations omitted).
380 254 F.3d 514 (en banc).
381 Id. at 516.
382 United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 121 (4th Cir. 2000) (2-0 decision) (citation omitted) (emphasis added), affid in part; vacated and remanded in part, 254 F.3d
514 (en banc).
383 See id. at 121-24.
384 Id. at 122-23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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fled. 38 5 Such a mandate, while appropriate in light of Apprendi, may
prove cumbersome and unmanageable to judges, for while
the judge may still determine the amount of drugs by a preponderance of the evidence for the purposes of calculating the offense
level and relevant conduct under the . . .Guidelines. However, if

the determination of the judge with respect to quantity leads to a
suggested sentence range under the Sentencing Guidelines that is
greater than the . .. statutory maximum, the judge only [sic] may
386
sentence at or below the statutory maximum penalty ....

Subsequently, the entire Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to
87
vacate the panel decision in order to rehear the appeal en banc.
While the case was vacated and remanded for determination of the
quantity of drugs attributable to one of the defendants, the overall
3
reasoning of the panel court was upheld.

8

The second example of the flood of petitions facing courts and
3 89
prosecutors as a result of Apprendi is Talbott v. Indiana.
The first

sentence of Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Talbott set the tone for
how the Seventh Circuit was going to handle this case: "Richard Talbott is among the throngs of state and federal prisoners who believe
that Apprendi v. New Jersey undermines their sentences. '390 He
continued,
Not one of the Apprendi-based applications for permission to file has
been granted ... and none is going to be granted in the near fu-

ture, for a fundamental reason: a new decision of the Supreme
Court justifies a second or successive collateral attack only if it establishes "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." . .. [Tihat retroactive application must be declared by the Supreme
Court itself

Apprendi does not state that it applies retroactively to other cases on
collateral review.... If the Supreme Court ultimately declares that
Apprendi applies retroactively on collateral attack, we will authorize
successive collateral review of cases to which Apprendi applies. Until

385

See id. at 123.

386
387
388
389
390

Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
See id. at 519.
226 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2000)
Id. at 868 (citation omitted).
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then prisonersshould hold their horses and stop wasting everyone's time with
39 1
futile applications.

The court explains that Apprendi only holds that circumstances
increasinga statutory maximum sentence must be treated as elements of

the offense, not sentences that fall within a statutory cap.392 Indeed,
many federal prisoners are convicted on drug charges. These prisoners are mistaken in thinking that Apprendi affects the holding of Edwards v. United States,3 93 Which held that the judge alone determines
drug types and quantities when imposing sentences short of the statutory maximum.A9 4 In sum, the Apprendi decision is resulting in "prisoners peppering district judges with initial collateral attacks. .... ,,3g5
The third example is United States v. Brown,39 6 a case where the

defendant was sentenced to life in prison under the federal "threestrikes-and-you're-out" law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994 & Supp. V
1999).397 The law requires a life sentence upon conviction of a "serious violent felony" if the defendant has previously been convicted of
two "serious violent" felonies. 3 98 Brown, the defendant, plead guilty
to a bank robbery wherein he used a baseball bat and during his escape had rammed a police officer's car.3 99 Brown argued, inter alia,
that the "three strikes" law violates due process by imposing on him
the burden of proving that a robbery is non-qualifying under that statute.40 0 Judge Posner dismissed this argument, however, noting that
Apprendi leaves undisturbed the principle that while the prosecution
must indeed prove all the elements of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt the legislation creating the offense can place the
burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant. What is
more, it can be a heightened burden of proof, like proof beyond a
391 Id. at 868-69 (citations omitted) (emphases added); accordTyler v. Cain, 121 S.
Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001) (holding that lower courts cannot apply Supreme Court decisions to make a rule retroactive for habeas purposes).
392 Talbott, 226 F.3d at 869.
393 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
394 See Talbot, 226 F.3d at 869-70 (referencing Edwards, 523 U.S. at 514).
395 Talbot, 226 F.3d at 869 (emphasis removed). Indeed, on December 4, 2000,
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded "for further consideration in light of Apprendi" the sentences of six defendants out of fifteen in a drug/firearm case before
Chief Judge Posner and Judges Easterbrook and Wood of the Seventh Circuit. See
Patterson v. United States, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000) (order granting cert.-vacating and
remanding).
396 276 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2002).
397 Id. at 931.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.
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reasonable doubt, and even more clearly therefore it can be as in
this case the lesser burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence.

40 1

Overall, "the federal 'three strikes' law does not alter the existing
statutory definition of bank robbery. It just allows the defendant to
show that the particular robbery he committed was not very
40 2
violent.
Finally, United States v. Promise,40 3 and in particular the concurring opinion ofJudge Luttig, is worthy of mention for several reasons.
To begin, Judge Luttig points out that in interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), the Fourth Circuit and every other court of
appeals "have unwittingly and unnecessarily reached and decided the
very question that the Supreme Court has as yet declined to answer,
and indeed expressly reserved in Apprendi, namely, whether all facts
that could serve to increase a defendant's sentence must be found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."40 4 This is "due largely to the
Supreme Court's own failure to distinguish clearly its statutory from
its constitutional analyses. '405 Nonetheless,
[t] he as-yet quite narrow constitutional principle of Apprendi is that
the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt only any fact that increases the maximum sentence authorizedfor the statutory offense. And
the holdings of Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Castillo-thatwhether
any given fact is an element of the offense (requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt) or a sentencing factor (requiring only proof by
a preponderance) is a question of legislative intent, and therefore
statutory interpretation-remain unaffected by Apprendi ....
[Judge Luttig remains f]aithful to the limited constitutional principle in Apprendi, but equally faithful to the bedrock principle of Almendarez-Torres,Jones, and Castillo that the power to define criminal
offenses rests in the legislature, subject only to constitutional
limitations ....
401 Id. at 932.
402 Id. at 933.
403 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001). Promiseis a drug case in which the district court
erred in sentencing the defendant to a term beyond the maximum allowable for possession of an unspecified amount of drugs without the amount attributable to the
defendant being charged in the indictment or found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to notice the plain
error of the district court given the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that
the defendant did in fact possess the amount of drugs attributed to him by the district
court. See id. at 161-65.
404 Id. at 169 (Luttig, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

405

Id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
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[T]he statutory maximum sentence for commission of [§ 841]
offenses, and therefore the punishment authorized by the jury's verdict of guilt of a section 841 offense, is life imprisonment, plus fine,
with the actual sentence imposed dependant upon judicial findings
of the presence or absence of the various sentencing factors, including drug 'amount and drug type, identified in section 841(b). Because the statutory maximum sentence for commission of the
offenses defined by Congress in section 841 is life plus fine, I would
hold that the principle of Apprendi... is not offended by any of the
sentences imposed in the cases before us because none of the
40 6
sentences at issue exceeds life imprisonment.
...

Promise also reveals that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is as
understandably confused by Apprendi as are the federal courts. 40 7 In
his concurrence, Judge Luttig points out that the DOJ is vacillating on
its position throughout the various § 841 trials are coming before the
Fourth Circuit on Apprendi-related appeals. 40 8 The DOJ first apprised
its attorneys that they may, but were not required, to argue that drug
amounts are mere sentencing factors. 40 9 Yet before the en banc court
of the Fourth Circuit, the DOJ
directly contradicted its earlier position in Promise, and equivocated
even on what, a month later, Would be its position... arguing inconsistently (if not incoherently) that... Congress plainly intended
drug quantity and type to be sentencing factors only, but, at the
same time, that the quantity and type of drug increase the statutory
maximum sentence and "it is error to impose a sentence that is authorized only by virtue of that increase in the maximum sentence
without proving that fact (type or quantity) to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt." Letter from Nina Goodman, DOJ, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, to Clerk of Court, Fourth Circuit (Feb. 22,
2001). Thus[,] ... unable to reconcile what it knows to be Congress' intent with what it either believes (mistakenly) or fears (prematurely) to be a holding by the Court in Apprendi that any fact that
increases a sentence significantly must be proven to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt, the United States now takes the novel position
that a fact that it concedes is not an element of the offense must
nevertheless be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as if it
were an element-apparently confusing a fact that increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, which the Supreme Court
characterized in Apprendi as "the functional equivalent" of an element of a greater offense, see 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, with a fact that
406 Id. at 169-70 (Luttig, J., concurring).
407

See id. at 182 (Luttig, J., concurring).

408
409

See id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
See id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
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increases a sentence, but only within the range of punishments au410
thorized by the legislature.
Judge Luttig explains the conundrum facing the DOJ:
And as if this position were not untenable enough, [the DOJ] assures us that, even though this "non-element" must be proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as if it were an element, it need
not be charged in the indictment for the reason that it is not a
"real" element-a position one cannot help but believe was formulated
solely because virtually every drug conviction in recent history would be re11
4

versed otherwise.

Indeed, federal prosecutors are basically taking the "safe route"
to avoid being overturned on appeal, which is for them to say that a
§ 841 offense has a twenty-year maximum unless the drug quantity is
specified in the indictment. 41 2 Yet, the pursuit of the "safe route"
forces those same federal prosecutors to abandon the zealous representation of their client, the United States. 4 13 But until the Court refines its decision in Apprendi, the DOJ is no less bound than the
4 14
federal appellate court judges by McMillan.
Judge Luttig elucidates the logical and practical difficulty of the
position that is thrust upon the DOJ by Apprendi:
I cannot even imagine the Supreme Court accepting such tortured
arguments as to those matters that must and must not be proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and those that must and must
not be charged in the indictment. Indeed, I have a hard time conceiving even that the Solicitor General would be prepared to ad4 15
vance such an argument before the Supreme Court.
Yet the Solicitor General has argued that point in briefs before
the Supreme Court. 4 16 The DOJ is attempting to avoid the logical
inconsistencies of its position by arguing that any Apprendi error in
many such drug cases does not require reversal under the plain-error
standard because the petitioners cannot show that the error both "affect[ed] substantial rights" and "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '417 The DOJ
argued that this is because evidence of drug quantity is essentially un410
411
412
413
414
415
416
(11th
417

Id. at 184-85 (Luttig, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 185 (Luttig, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See id. at 184 (Luttig, J., concurring).
See id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
See id. at 186 (Luttig, J., concurring).
Id. at 185 (Luttig, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 6, Barrios v. United States, 245 F.3d 793
Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 50 (Oct. 1, 2001) (No. 00-1787).
Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
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disputed in these cases 418 and because the petitioners could have
been sentenced to the same overall prison term through the imposition of partially consecutive sentences on each count as allowed by the
4 19
Sentencing Guidelines.
Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court adequately resolves the
many Apprendi-related problems, federal prosecutors will be forced to
wade through the confusion and uncertainty caused by the Apprendi
decision, take the unnecessary step of submitting drug quantity and
type in every § 841 indictment, and prove those beyond a reasonable
doubt. Further, those prosecutors must now either (1) secure instructions that quantity and type are elements of the offense (i.e., so that a
general verdict will be binding on the elements), or (2) ask for a special verdict that specifically states the weight and type. 420
3.

What the Future Holds: Uncertainty for Sentencing Judges4 21

Apprendi will likely have an extremely damaging effect on sentencing conducted in the immediate future under current determinate-sentencing schemes. 422 Since the Court failed to "clarify the
precise contours of the constitutional principle [if any] underlying its
decision, federal and state judges are left in a state of limbo."4 23
These judges are unsure if they should "continue to assume the constitutionality of the determinate-sentencing schemes under which they
have operated for so long, and proceed to sentence convicted defendants in accord with those governing statutes and guidelines."4 24 The
majority "provides no answer, yet [the Court's] reasoning suggests
42 5
that each [future] sentence will rest on shaky ground."
Federal courts are noting Apprendi's tumultuous effect. For example, one district court judge pointed out that Apprendi "completely
abrogated existing law in every federal circuit."4 26 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals proclaimed that "[t] he rule in Apprendihas 'radically
418 See id. at 9.
419 See id. at 10.
420 See generally FED. P. CRis. P. 31 (Verdict); id. 32(d) (1) (Sentence and Judgment, In General).
421 Career prosecutors and law professors are also questioning the Court's
decision, echoing the concerns of the Apprendi dissenters. See, e.g., Blakey Interview,
supra note 369.
422 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
423 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
424 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
425 Id. at 551-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
426 West v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846 (D. Md. 2000).
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departed from this court's prior treatment of the quantity of drugs as
a sentencing factor rather than as an element of the offense.' "427 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was even more blunt in its disapproval.
In a case involving a drug conspiracy and particularly brutal multiple
murder, that court indicated that manifest injustice actually resulted
from the Supreme Court's widely unexpected Apprendi decision:
One cannot help but note the unfortunate consequences here: conspirators who killed or maimed seven people without compunction,
three of them in one family and two in another, in order to wipe out
their rivals or intimidate witnesses, may [only] be sentenced to a
maximum of 20 or 30 years in prison. Yet, had it been forewarned
of Apprendi, the government could have restructured its charges to
emphasize the murders and attempted murders or add a statement
on drug quantities. As it stands, a disproportionately lenient result
is compelled by our current precedent. 428
To avoid Apprendi-created manifest injustice in a Fourth Circuit
case, that court of appeals actually declined to notice plain Apprendi
error even though specific threshold drug quantity was not alleged in
the indictment because the defendant did not assert that lack of notice precluded him from disputing drug quantity. 42 9 The court unequivocally stated, "It would be a miscarriage of justice to allow [the
defendant] to avoid a sentence for the aggravated drug trafficking
crime that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates he committed.
'4 30
We therefore declined to notice the error.
The question also arises as to whether judges are now restricted
in sentencing. Traditionally, no limitation was placed on the ability of
a judge to sentence consecutively based on factors that may not have
been presented to the jury. Nevertheless, if a judge now exceeds the
maximum sentence, the Apprendi holding applies and the judge will
be overruled on appeal. But if the judge sentences consecutivelythereby staying under the maximum statutory penalty-Apprendi does
not apply and the judge will not be overruled. 43 1 This situation has the
potential to return our system to the very disparitiesand incongruoussentences
that the sentencing reform initiatives of the past three decades were designed to
erase.
427 United States v. Alvarez, 266 F.3d 587, 597 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
428 United States v. Baptiste, 264 F.3d 578, 594-95 (5th Cir. 2001).
429 See United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001).
430 Id. at 164.
431 The Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal addressed this issue and came
to different conclusions. See supra note 379 (providing a discussion of United States v.
Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Bradford, 246 F.3d
1107, 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court came to an incorrect conclusion in Apprendi in holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The procedures mandated by the
New Jersey legislature in its "hate crime statute" are consistent with
traditional sentencing practice. Further, echoing Justice Breyer's
comment that although "additional procedural protections might well
be desirable," 43 2 this Comment reflected why the Constitution does
not require such extra safeguards where ordinary sentencing factors
are at issue.
Prior to the Court's June 2000 ruling in this case, uncertainty was
not present across the country among legislative bodies, attorneys,
and judges as they walked "an unidentified path . . .between state

autonomy to define crimes and the safeguards for criminal defendants embodied in the Due Process Clause." 433 The Court's newly cre-

ated "elements" of crimes lead to important unanswered theoretical
questions regarding which party is responsible for the requisite burden of proof, to whom this burden must be proven, by what constitutional limitations, and to what degree of confidence. The question
also arises whether the Supreme CourtJustices-or some other undetermined reviewing body-are going to put limitations on and review
what the legislative bodies can establish as elements of a crime. Additionally, a true constitutional crisis may develop if post-Apprendi legislatures, unable to appropriately raise sentences based on standards of
proof, begin to manipulate criminal codes and sentencing provisions
through careful and clever draftsmanship.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Court in Apprendi is constitutionalizing the "elements" of an offense. What is clear, however, is the
magnitude of problems that will face judges, attorneys, and defendants in the aftermath of the Court's unfortunate decision in Apprendi.
While no history can be found that says there should be sentencing
factors, no history can be found that says that there should not be sentencing factors. Accordingly, the legislative branch of government
should have the authority and power to exercise this prerogative.
The Supreme Court has provided no compelling reason why
Congress or a state legislature may not decree what constitutes the
432 Apprendi v. Unted States, 530 U.S. 466, 565-66 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
433 Joshua S. Bratspies, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Limiting the Ability of States To
Define Elements of an Offense in the Context of Hate Crime Legislation, 30 SErON HALL L.
REV. 893, 921 (2000).
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elements or sentencing factors in particular crimes. The Court should
recognize the errors of the Apprendi decision and overrule it or severely limit it at the earliest opportunity. The precedent established
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,4 34 which held that a court may use the
preponderance of evidence standard when considering a sentencing
factor,435 should continue to be followed. Otherwise, the future holds
"what will likely prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion

'43 6

for defendants, judges, and attorneys. Furthermore, Apprendi

will continue to create an unnecessary backlog in the court system
throughout the United States.

434
435
436

477 U.S. 79 (1979).
See id. at 84-91.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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WITH AN

ELEMENT ANALYSIS

A.
1.

Statutes Related to Weapons Possession

43 7
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)

2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes
(a) Firearms. Any person who has in his possession any firearm
with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of
another is guilty of a crime of the second degree.
2.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a) (2) (West 1995)

2C:43-6. Sentence of imprisonment for crime; ordinary terms;
mandatory terms
(a) Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted
of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment, as follows:
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term
of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five
years and 10 years;

B.
1.

Statutes Related to "Hate Crimes"

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001)
The court ...shall,1 438 upon application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a person who has been convicted of a crime.., to an
extended term if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
grounds in subsection e....
e. The defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race,
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.

2.

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a) (3) (West 1995)
2C:43-7. Sentence of imprisonment for crime; extended terms

437 Element Analysis follows infra at app. C.
438 Author's Explanatory Note: Section 2C:43-7(a) uses the word "may" in delineating what actions a sentencing judge could possibly take regarding all of the
subsections of section 2C:44-3. However, section 2G:44-3 specifically indicates that the
court "shall" sentence a person to an extended term if any of the criteria of subsection
(e) to section 2C:44-3 is satisfied.
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a. In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3, a person who has
been convicted of a crime may14391 be sentenced ...to an extended
term of imprisonment, as follows:
(3) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a term which
shall be fixed by the court between 10 and 20 years.
C. Element Analysis
1.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)
2C:39-4. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes
(a) Firearms. Any person who has in his possession any firearm
with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of
another is guilty of a crime in the second degree.

Jurisdiction here is, by definition of the title of the New Jersey
statute, a state prosecution. Before conducting the elemental analysis,
it is appropriate to look for guidance in the "introductory" or "definitions" section(s) of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice:
a.

Under "General principles of liability; possession as an act,"
the following instruction is given:

(c) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this section, if the
possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was
aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able
440
to terminate the possession.
b.

Under "Kinds of culpability defined," the following
definitions are found:

(1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature
of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage' in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person
acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that
they exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or equivalent
terms have the same meaning.
(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature
of is conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is
aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is
439

See supra note 438.

440 NJ. STAT.

ANN.

§ 2C:2-1 (c) (West 1995).
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practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same
441
meaning.
c.

Under "Construction of statutes with respect to culpability
requirements," the following instruction is given:

(1) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of
culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the materialelements of the offense, unless a contrary
442
purpose plainly appears.
Therefore, applying the preceding guidance to the applicable
statute in Apprendi, one derives the following elemental analysis.
2.

NJ.

STAT. ANN.§

2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)

2C:394. Possession of weapons for unlawful purposes
a. Firearms. Any person who has in his possession any firearm with
a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime in the second degree.
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF WEAPONS FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE:

Who:

(any) person
(actor)

Conduct

possess

Attendant
Circumstances:

firearm
(grading)4 4 3

--

knowingly and with purpose to use
unlawfully against another person

Result:

possess

-+

knowingly

State of Mind of Actor

441
442

-

knowingly and with purpose to use
unlawfully against another person

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b) (1-2) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c) (1) (West 1995) (emphasis added).

443 Certain non-firearms weapons violations, including "other weapons" and
"imitation firearms," are considered crimes of the third and fourth degrees,
respectively. Hence, "firearm" in this elemental
circumstance labeled as "grading."

analysis is a surrounding
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